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NEITHER LIBERTY NOR JUSTICE: ANTI-GAY
INITIATIVES, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION, AND THE
RULE OF LAW
Wherever the real power in a Government lies, there is
the danger of oppression. In our Governments the real
power lies in the majority of the Community, and the
invasion of private rights is chiefly to be apprehended,
not from acts of Government contrary to the sense of its
constituents, but from acts in which the Government is
the mere instrument of the major number of the Constit-
uents. This is a truth of great importance, but not yet
sufficiently attended to .... I
INTRODUCTION
Early on the Saturday morning of June 27, 1969, drag queen Sylvia
Rivera "was just not in the mood" when police raided the Stonewall Inn,
a popular gay bar located in New York City's Greenwich Village.2 Ap-
parently, many of the Stonewall's patrons-ranging from full-time trans-
vestites to straight-looking Upper East Side professionals-felt the same.
They saw the bar as an "oasis" and "a safe retreat from the harassment of
[homosexuals in] everyday life.. . ."3 They were tired of police aggres-
sion and brutality; tired of legalized discrimination; tired of reprobation.4
So when police stormed into the bar that morning, just as they had done
two weeks earlier, the 200 patrons of the Stonewall Inn did not scatter
and disappear into the darkness of morning.5 They resisted. "You could
feel the electricity going through people," Rivera remembers, "You
could actually feel it. People were getting really, really pissed. .... 6The
crowd started to toss coins and scream epithets at the officers but soon
graduated to throwing bottles, cans and bricks. Rioters set fires, broke
windows, and vandalized police vehicles, finally taking control of the
street and forcing the officers into the Stonewall's interior. According to
Deputy Inspector Pine, "I had been in combat situations, [but] there was
1 Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 387 (Douglas, J., concurring) (citing 5 WRrnINGS
OF JAMES MADISON 272 (Hunt ed. 1904)).
2 MARMN DUBERMAN, SToNnwALL 193 (1993).
3 Id. at 182.
4 See infra § I(A)(1).
5 See DuBERMAN, supra note 2, at 196.
6 Id.
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never any time that I felt more scared than then."7 Pine called for a spe-
cially-trained riot-control unit to help suppress the violence; an uneasy
and temporary calm descended at about three-thirty that morning, more
than two hours after the police raid had begun. But two more nights of
rioting followed before the peace was finally secure."
The unrest at the Stonewall Inn, often referred to as the "Stonewall
Rebellion," 9 marks a turning point in the gay rights10 movement. Ac-
cording to Professor Patricia Cain, Stonewall "provided a symbolic radi-
cal shift in lesbian and gay arguments for civil rights."'1 It reflected a
changing sociopolitical climate. She sketches the historical context of the
Stonewall Rebellion as follows:
Martin Luther King preached nonviolent opposition to
the racist power structure and led civil rights marches to
protest the inequality between black and white Ameri-
cans. Student radicals in Berkeley . . . claim[ed] their
free speech rights. Students . . . protest[ed] the war in
Viet Nam.... In 1968, protestors at the Democratic con-
vention in Chicago were beaten by police officers. It was
7 Id. at 198.
8 For a historical account of the Stonewall Rebellion, see id. at 181.
9 See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, Litigatingfor Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Legal History, 79
VA. L. REv. 1551, 1580 (1993).
10 Although the word "gay" in this Note usually refers to gay men, terms such as "pro-
gay" and "gay rights" are meant to include lesbians and bisexuals. Additionally, I use the word
"homosexual" to refer to lesbians and bisexuals as well as to gay men. Some people object to
the clinical and sexual overtones of the word "homosexual," noting that clinicians introduced
the term in association with their descriptions of homosexuality as a pathology. See id. at 1626
(citing DAVID F. GREENBERG, TIE CONSTRUCTION OF HoMosEXUALrrY 2-3 (1988); Mary Mc-
Intosh, The Homosexual Role, in FoAss OF DEsnRE 27-28 (Edward Stein ed., 1990)). Further-
more, many lesbians believe that the word "homosexual" conjures up the image of the gay
man and thus excludes women. MARGARET CRUIKSHANK, THm GAY AND LESBIAN MOVEMENT
4 (1992). One could also object to including bisexuals under a heading that implies strict same-
sex attractions. Although I agree with these criticisms, I can find no suitable substitute for the
word "homosexual," and so I continue to use it. Some writers prefer the term "gay," because it
lacks the clinical overtones of "homosexual" and because it was "chosen by [gays themselves],
as a sign of [their] refusal to be named by, judged by, or controlled by the dominant majority."
CRUIKSHANK, supra, at 91. But "gay," like "homosexual," excludes lesbians and bisexuals.
The word "queer" may eventually prove superior to any of these words in that it does not
distinguish between lesbian, gay and bisexual people and even leaves open the possible inclu-
sion of other groups, like transvestites. I suspect that much of the problem with terminology in
pro-gay literature stems from the fact that the homosexual-heterosexual dichotomy constructed
by theorists does not accurately reflect human sexual behavior. Human sexuality, according to
Alfred Kinsey, is a continuum: 'The world is not to be divided into sheep and goats.... Only
the human mind invents categories and tries to force facts into separated pigeon-holes. The
living world is a continuum in each and every one of its aspects. The sooner we learn this
concerning human sexual behavior the sooner we shall reach a sound understanding of the
realities of sex." ALFRED C. KNSEY Er AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR iN TmE HUMAN MAtE 639
(1948).
11 Cain, supra note 9, at 1581.
NEITHER LIBERTY NOR JUSTICE
within this broader context of resistance and public chal-
lenges to governmental authority that the Stonewall riots
began. 1
2
The gay liberation movement of the 1960s, like other political move-
ments during that decade, revealed the inherent tension between political
obligation and justified resistance to law.13 The "drag queens and the
nellies" 14 who threw bricks at police officers outside the Stonewall Inn
refused to subordinate themselves to an unjust legal system. In certain
respects, they resembled political protesters engaged in civil disobedi-
ence. The brutal treatment they customarily received at the hands of the
police had slowly attenuated their sense of obligation to law and had
ultimately fueled, and perhaps even justified, their resistance to its
officers. 15
This Note discusses political obligation and justified resistance to
law in the context of Romer v. Evans,16 the most important gay rights
case to reach the Supreme Court since Bowers v. Hardwick.17 In Romer,
the Court invalidated Amendment Two, a proposed amendment to the
Colorado Constitution, which lower courts had characterized as unconsti-
tutionally "'fencing out' an independently identifiable class of per-
sons;"18 as violating the Equal Protection Clause by "[a]lowing the
majority to prohibit a small, unpopular group of citizens from obtaining
favorable legislation;"'19 and as "undermin[ing] the integrity of our na-
tion"20 by "giv[ing] effect... to private prejudice."'2' The Court had an
opportunity in Romer to affirm the Colorado Supreme Court's finding
that the United States Constitution protects a fundamental interest in
equal participation in the political process. But it declined to do so.
Although it affirmed the judgment of Colorado's highest court, it did so
on different grounds.22
12 Id. at 1580 (footnote omitted).
13 See infra §§ II(A), II(B) (discussing political obligation and justified rule departures).
14 "The symbolic power of Stonewall lay in the fact that it was the drag queens and the
nellies-the most unassimilated-who were the most visible and the most vocal." Cain, supra
note 9, at 1581.
15 See infra §§ II(A), 11(B) (discussing political obligation and justified rule departures).
16 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
17 478 U.S. 186 (1986); see also infra § I(A)(3).
18 Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1282 (Colo.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 959 (1993); see
also Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417, 433
(S.D. Ohio 1994) (citing Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89,94 (1965)), aff'd in part, vacated in
part, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995), vacated, 116 S. Ct. 2519 (1996) (remanding in light of
Romer, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996)).
19 Equality Found., 860 F. Supp. at 433.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 444 (citing Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984)).
22 Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1624 (1996).
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The Supreme Court struck down Amendment Two by applying a
mere rational basis review (in contrast to the state supreme court, which
had subjected the challenged law to strict scrutiny). Justice Kennedy
wrote that the law "fail[ed], indeed defie[d], even this conventional in-
quiry." 3 The Court's holding, therefore, represents a strong statement
about the Constitution's intolerance for government-sanctioned preju-
dice. And for many citizens, the Court's favorable posture towards les-
bian, gay and bisexual people represents a welcome, albeit belated,
event. The Court's decision has two additional benefits, as well. First, by
declining to utilize the state court's rationale, the Supreme Court avoided
the elucidation of yet another fundamental right. It thereby escaped the
inevitable criticism that would have followed such action since, in this
aftermath of the Warren Court Era, many lawyers and scholars view the
substantive due process doctrine as an albatross.24 Second, the Court
wisely chose to steer clear of this terrain in the context of a gay rights
case. If it had adopted the rationale of the state court, it would have only
fueled the anti-gay argument that the Romer plaintiffs sought "special
rights" from the state of Colorado.25
Ultimately, even while declining to recognize a "new" fundamental
interest, the Court acknowledged the importance of fair and equal polit-
ical participation. If one reads between the lines in Romer, one sees that
the Court has, through its biting application of the rational basis test,
created a case that harmonizes with the precedent relied upon by the
Colorado Supreme Court. And so it must have. As this Note will demon-
strate, equal political participation is "'implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty,' such that 'neither liberty nor justice would exist if [it] were sac-
rificed.' "26 Section One of the Note presents the legal context of Romer
v. Evans by surveying the lesbian, gay and bisexual struggle for equal
rights; by describing contemporary equal protection doctrine; and by ex-
amining equal protection challenges to laws like the one stuck down in
Romer. Section Two analyzes the moral context of the case by consider-
ing the holding of the Colorado court in the framework of John Rawls' A
Theory of Justice.27 It discusses possible theoretical grounds for a prima
facie obligation to obey the law; presents an argument for justified rule
departures; and examines the effect of those departures on political sta-
bility. Section Three concludes that anti-gay laws like the ballot initiative
invalidated in Romer threaten civil society by attenuating the obligation
to obey the law, suggesting that an interest in equal political participation
23 Id. at 1627.
24 See infra note 374 and accompanying text.
25 Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629-30 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
26 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-92 (1986) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937)).
27 JoHN RAWLs, A THEORY oF JusncE (1971).
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is "[c]entral both to the idea of the rule of law and to our own Constitu-
tion's guarantee of equal protection .... 
2
I. THE LEGAL CONTEXT
The lesbian, gay and bisexual community burst out of its closet that
June morning in 1969 when the patrons of the Stonewall Inn stood up to
the New York police.29 Their act of resistance resulted in heightened
visibility for the queer community as a whole-as more and more people
publicly acknowledged their homosexuality. 30 But the Stonewall Rebel-
lion did riot, contrary to popular mythology, christen the modem gay
rights movement.3 ' This Section traces that movement from the pre-
Stonewall era to the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Bowers v.
Hardwick to the present gay rights battles on the equal protection front. It
also presents a basic overview of equal protection doctrine in order to lay
the groundwork for its subsequent analysis of the Colorado court's rec-
ognition of a fundamental interest in equal participation in the political
process.
A. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE GAY RIGHTS MOVEMENT
3 2
1. The Pre-Stonewall Era
American homophobia33 has expressed itself in violence and dis-
crimination for over four centuries. During that time period, lesbian, gay
and bisexual people have been
condemned to death by choking, burning, and drowning;
[have been] executed, jailed, pilloried, fined, court-mar-
tialed, prostituted, fired, framed, blackmailed, disinher-
ited, declared insane, driven to insanity, to suicide, [to]
28 Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628.
29 Cain, supra note 9, at 1582 (citing JOHN D'EMmio, SExUAL POLITICS, SEXuAL COM-
MUNrrmEs 219, 237-38 (1983) [hereinafter D'EMmLO, SEXUAL PoLmcs]).
30 Id.
31 Id. at 1580.
32 Much of the discussion in this subsection comes from an article by Professor Patricia
A. Cain. See id. at 1555-1612. Professor Cain, in turn, credits Jonathan Katz, Martin
Duberman, Lillian Faderman, Barry Adam, Randy Shilts, Eric Marcus and John D'Emilio for
the historical information contained in her article. Id. at 1552-53 (citing JONATHAN KATZ, GAY
AMERICAN HISTORY (REv. ED. 1992); DUBERMAN, supra note 2; LiLLAN FADERMAN, ODD
GruS AND TWILIGHT LovERs: A HISTORY OF LESBIAN LIFE IN TWErIEr CENTURY AMERICA
(1991); BARRY D. ADAM, THE RISE OF A GAY AND LESBIAN MOvEEmNT (1987); RANDY
SHmTS, CONDUCT UNBECOMING: LESBIANS AND GAYS IN THE U.S. MILITARY, VIErNAM TO THE
PERSIAN GULF (1993); ERIC MARCUS, MAKING HISTORY: THE STRUGGLE FOR GAY AND
LESBIAN EQUAL RIGHTs, 1945-1990 (1992); D'Emuo, SEXUAL PoLmcs, supra note 29; John
D'Emilio, MAKING TROUBLE (1992)).
33 The dictionary defines "homophobia" as an "aversion to gay or homosexual people or
their lifestyle or culture." AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 867
(3d ed. 1992).
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murder, and [to] self-hate, [have been] witch-hunted, en-
trapped, stereotyped, mocked, insulted, isolated, pitied,
castigated, and despised . . [have been] castrated,
lobotomized, shock-treated, and psychoanalyzed. .... 34
Nevertheless, the queer community has persistently resisted its subordi-
nation at the hands of a heterosexual majority.
In 1924, during which time "[r]epression was standard practice,"
35
Henry Gerber founded the first public gay rights organization in the
United States.36 The Society for Human Rights, as he called it, survived
for only a short time before Chicago police arrested and jailed several of
its members. 37 Some twenty years later, however, after World War II,
several gay men established the more long-lived Mattachine Society in
Los Angeles. 38 They began publishing the magazine One, a collection of
news, information, and other writing of interest to the lesbian, gay and
bisexual community. In 1954, the U.S. Postal Service confiscated the
October issue of One, refusing to deliver it on the grounds that it con-
tained obscenity. 39 The magazine brought suit in federal court, claiming
that the Postal Service had violated its First Amendment rights; had
abridged its right to equal protection of the law; had deprived it of prop-
erty without due process; and that the Postmaster had abused his discre-
tion. Although One lost at the trial and appellate levels, it triumphed at
the Supreme Court, and chapters of the Mattachine Society, along with
those of another important homophile4o organization-the Daughters of
Bilitis (a lesbian group founded in San Francisco in 1955) 41-began to
appear throughout the country.42 These organizations concentrated on the
social and informational needs of lesbian, gay and bisexual people, as
34 KATz, supra note 32, at 11.
35 Cain, supra note 9, at 1556.
36 Id. at 1555-56.
37 Id. at 1556. A wife of one of the members had turned the organization in to the Chi-
cago police. The police never made the charges clear and eventually the case was dismissed.
Id.
38 Id. at 1558. According to Jonathan N. Katz, the name "Mattachine" came from a
medieval secret society of unmarried men. These men wore masks during rituals in which they
protested oppression. Harry Hay, one of Mattachine's founders, felt that the name signified the
position of homosexuals in the United States in the 1950s: "masked and unknown figures,
fighting for social change." Id. at 1558 n.43 (citing KATZ, supra note 32, at 412-13).
39 Id. at 1559.
40 The Mattachine Society used the term "homophile" instead of "homosexual" to de-
scribe the organization's membership because of the negative connotations attached to the
latter term. See ANDREA WEISS & GRETA SCHILLER, BEFORm STONEWALL: THE MAKING OF A
GAY AND LESBIAN COMMUNITY 40-41 (1988). I use the term here to describe Daughters of
Bilitis because of the historical similarities between the two organizations.
41 A lesbian couple, Del Martin and Phyllis Lyon, formed the Daughters of Bilitis. Cain,
supra note 9, at 1561.
42 Id.
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well as on civil rights issues.43 In addition to providing the magazine
One, for example, the Mattachine Society backed Frank Kameny when
he challenged his government employer for dismissing him based on his
sexual orientation.44 At the time, such dismissals were commonplace;
45
in fact, in 1953, President Eisenhower extended a World War II policy
that excluded lesbian and gay Americans from the armed services to the
entire federal civil service.46
2. The Stonewall Era
In addition to suffering discriminatory treatment on the job during
that time period, lesbian, gay and bisexual people faced intimidation and
harassment in the few places in which they could socialize. Bars and
nightclubs served an important social function for the queer community
during the 1950s and 1960s, 47 and state authorities frequently harassed
the patrons and owners of these establishments. Several important cases
during those decades centered on the associational rights of lesbians and
gay men.48 In Stoumen v. Reilly,49 for example, the California Supreme
Court created what was probably the first favorable gay rights holding in
the United States. 50 In finding that the California Board of Equalization
could not suspend an owner's liquor license just because his place of
business catered to known homosexuals, the justices wrote:
The fact that the Black Cat was reputed to be a "hang-
out" for homosexuals indicates merely that it was a
meeting place for such persons. Unlike evidence that an
establishment is reputed to be a house of prostitution,
which means a place where prostitution is practiced and
thus necessarily implies the doing of illegal or immoral
43 None of these groups concentrated specifically on legal issues, however. See id. at
1564.
44 Id. at 1561-62. Kameny lost in both the lower and in the appellate court; the Supreme
Court denied certiorari. See id. at 1574, 1575 n.142; see also MARcUs, supra note 32, at 93-
103 (quoting Kameny describing his story).
45 See generally Cain, supra note 9, at 1572-80 (describing several cases of discrimina-
tion against homosexual employees in government service).
46 Kenneth L. Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and the Desegregation of the Armed
.Forces, 38 UCLA L. REv. 499,567 n.254 (1991) (citing ALLAN BERUBE, COMING OUT UNDER
FIRE: Tim HIsTORY OF GAY MEN AND WOMEN IN WORLD WAR 1 265-70 (1990)). This ban
was ended in the mid-1970s. Id. (citing T. SAmN & K. KAROLS, NONCONFORMING SEXUAL
ORmNTrA-IONS AND MNrARY SurrABnury 5 (1988) (a Department of Defense study indicat-
ing that the military's exclusion of homosexuals should be thoroughly re-examined)); see also
Cain, supra note 9, at 1572-80 (discussing employment discrimination).
47 See D'EMniO, SEXUAL PoLrrcs, supra note 29, at 12-13; FADERMAN, supra note 32,
at 79-80.
48 See generally Cain, supra note 9, at 1567-72.
49 234 P.2d 969 (Cal. 1951).
50 Cain, supra note 9, at 1567.
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acts on the premises, testimony that a restaurant and bar
is reputed to be a meeting place for a certain class of
persons contains no such implication. Even habitual or
regular meetings may be for purely social and harmless
purposes, such as the consumption of food and drink,
and it is to be presumed that a person is innocent of
crime or wrong and that the law has been obeyed.5 1
Nonetheless, California authorities continued to harass the patrons
of gay bars and to revoke the owners' liquor licenses. 52 Similar official
conduct occurred throughout the country.5 3 As late as 1967, the City of
Miami prohibited liquor licensees from employing "known homosex-
ual[s], from selling liquor to a known homosexual, and from allowing
two or more homosexuals to congregate on the[irl premises. '54 Given
this background of official intimidation, it is not surprising that the gay
bars of the period had an illicit, clandestine atmosphere. One patron of
the Stonewall Inn described it as "a real dive, an awful, sleazy place set
up by the Mob for hustlers .... -55 In fact, the owners of many gay bars
had ties to the Mafia.56 These mostly-heterosexual owners treated their
lesbian and gay clientele contemptuously, watering down drinks and in-
flating prices. 57 Payoffs to the police protected the bars from closure.58
But police raids continued. Officers would appear unexpectedly, arrest
patrons and employees, and confiscate liquor.59 It was in this climate of
intimidation and harassment that the confrontation at the Stonewall Inn
occurred.
After the Stonewall Rebellion in 1969, the lesbian, gay and bisexual
community became more visible as individuals began to openly identify
themselves as queer in larger numbers than ever before. "The silence of
the closet was broken.., as the ranks of persons willing to stand up and
be counted as lesbian and gay swelled significantly. ' '60 More gay rights
organizations appeared and their memberships grew. This newfound visi-
bility paved the way for the 1977 election of Harvey Milk to the Board of
City Supervisors of San Francisco. Eight years after Stonewall, Milk be-
51 Stoumen, 234 P.2d at 971 (citation omitted).
52 Cain, supra note 9, at 1568-69.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 1572. A Florida court upheld the ordinance as a rational means through which to
protect the public health, morals and safety. Id. (citing Inman v. City of Miami, 197 So. 2d 50,
51 (1967), cert. denied, 201 So. 2d 895 (Fla. 1967), and cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1048 (1968)).
55 DUBERMAN, supra note 2, at 181 (quoting gay journalist Jim Fouratt).
56 For an interesting account of the Stonewall's Mob managers, see id. at 183-85.
57 Id. at 181.
58 Id. at 185.
59 Id. at 183, 192. The first openly gay bar in Manhattan lost twelve cases of liquor and
fifty cases of beer during its first raid. Id. at 183.
60 Cain, supra note 9, at 1582.
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came the first openly-gay elected official in the United States.61 During
his tenure, he worked to represent the interests of all of San Francisco's
minority communities.62 When Proposition Six-an anti-gay plebiscite
aimed at lesbian and gay schoolteachers-appeared on the California
ballot, he campaigned vigorously against it.63 Unfortunately, Milk's term
was cut short twenty days after the defeat of Proposition Six and eleven
months after his election to the Board when former City Supervisor Dan
White shot and killed Milk in his office in City Hall.64
Gay rights advocates did not give up despite the loss of Harvey
Milk. They argued against anti-gay initiatives 65 like the one defeated in
California 66 and worked to secure the passage of laws and policies for-
bidding discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Their efforts
met with strenuous opposition.67 Actress and singer Anita Bryant, for
example, spearheaded a successful campaign to repeal a six-month-old
61 THE TIMEs OF HARVEY MILK (Cinecom International Films 1986).
62 See, e.g., id.
63 Id. Proposition Six was also known as the "Briggs Initiative." Id.
64 Id. Dan White shot and killed the Mayor of San Francisco as well. Both men were in
their offices at City Hall when the assassinations occurred. In a verdict that stunned the les-
bian, gay and bisexual community, the citizens of San Francisco, and the nation, Dan White
was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and sentenced to seven years in prison. Commenta-
tors had assumed that White would receive the death penalty. White's defense centered around
his depression and his sugar-laden diet. The media termed it the 'Twinkle Defense." Id.; see
also CRUIKSHANK, supra note 10, at 74 (claiming that the voir dire examination eliminated
people of color and lesbian or gay people so that the jury wound up looking just like Dan
White: straight, white and middle-class).
Milk knew from the beginning of his campaign for a position on the Board that, as a gay
man, his assassination "could happen any day, at any place, at any time." THE TIMES OF HAR-
vEY MILK, supra note 61. After his election, he made a recording in which he said, "If a bullet
should enter my brain, let that bullet destroy every closet door.... I would like to see every
gay lawyer, every gay architect come out, stand up and let the world know. That would do
more to end prejudice overnight than anybody could imagine. I urge them to do that, urge them
to come out. Only that way will we start to achieve our rights." LAnRY GRoss, CONTESTED
CLosEms: Tem PoLrrcs AND ETmcs oF OurNo 24-25 (1993). On the night of his death, with
thousands of San Franciscans holding white candles, Milk's recording was broadcast from the
steps of City Hall. THE TIMES OF HARvEY MIK, supra note 61. For a thorough examination of
Dan White's motives and the events leading up to Milk's assassination, see id.
65 An "initiative" is a special form of "plebiscite," in which citizens place a measure on
the ballot by securing a specified number of signatures. The population at large then votes for
or against the measure in a general election. A "referendum" is a plebiscite in which a measure
is ratified or disapproved by the electorate after its adoption by the legislature. Laws are more
commonly enacted by legislative drafting and ratification. See generally Robin Charlow, Judi-
cial Review, Equal Protection and the Problem with Plebiscites, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 527,
531-32 (1994) (arguing against a special level of judicial review for laws adopted by initia-
tive). Voters have used both methods to pass anti-gay laws, but because such laws are usually
referred to as "initiatives," I adopt that language here. The plebiscite process is often referred
to as "direct democracy:'
66 Washington state voters defeated a similar initiative at about the same time. ADAM,
supra note 32, at 104-06.
67 See, e.g., id. at 102-20.
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pro-gay ordinance in Dade County, Florida.68 But the lesbian, gay and
bisexual community persevered. In addition to calling for gay-protective
laws in the areas of housing and employment, pro-gay legal defense or-
ganizations began to consider a constitutional challenge to state bans on
sodomy. 69
3. The Hardwick Era
The events that would provide the basis for that challenge occurred
on the morning of August 3, 1982 when Officer K. R. Torick, of the
Atlanta Police Department, arrested Michael Hardwick7° for committing
the crime of sodomy, defined by a Georgia statute as "any sexual act
involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of an-
other."71 A sodomy conviction carries a sentence of one to twenty years
in prison.72 Attorneys from the Georgia affiliate of the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) approached Michael Hardwick shortly after his
arrest.73 They had visited courtrooms every day for the previous five
68 Id. at 103-04.
69 People often fail to understand the central role played by criminal sodomy statutes in
discrimination against lesbian, gay and bisexual people: equating homosexuality with sodomy
and sodomy with criminal activity figures at the core of governmental discrimination against
homosexuals. Sodomy statutes threaten lesbian, gay and bisexual people with surveillance,
arrest, indictment, conviction and imprisonment. For a discussion of the importance to the
queer community of challenging such laws, see Cain, supra note 9, at 1587 (sodomy statutes
"are the bedrock of legal discrimination against gay men and lesbians") (quoting Abby
Rubenfeld, the former director of the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund); Anne B.
Goldstein, History, Homosexuality, and Political Values: Searching for the Hidden Determi-
nants of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE L.J. 1073 (1988); Janet E. Halley, Reasoning About
Sodomy: Act and Identity In and After Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 1721 (1993).
70 For details of the Hardwick arrest, see PEER IRONS, THE COURAGE OF THEIR CONVIC-
TIONS: SIXTEEN AMERICANS WHO FoUolrr THEIR WAY TO THE SUPREME COURT 392-403
(1988); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1422-24 (1988); see also Cain,
supra note 9, at 1612; Mary Anne Case, Couples and Coupling in the Public Sphere: A Com-
ment on the Legal History of Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights, 79 VA. L. REv. 1643,
1652-53 (1993); Francisco Valdes, Sexual Minorities in the Military: Charting the Constitu-
tional Frontiers of Status and Conduct, 27 CREIGrroN L. REv. 384, 431-34 (1994).
71 GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984).
72 "A person convicted of the offense of sodomy shall be punished by imprisonment for
not less than one nor more than 20 years." Id.
73 IRONS, supra note 70, at 382. In 1957, when the ACLU issued its first national policy
statement on gay rights, it endorsed the constitutionality of sodomy statutes (the ACLU also
considered an employee's homosexuality as relevant to the issuance of a security clearance).
Cain, supra note 9, at 1583. Ten years later, the ACLU endorsed the idea that the privacy
rights recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut should extend to all private consensual sexual
conduct between adults-heterosexual as well as homosexual. D'EMIio, SEXUAL POLITICS,
supra note 29, at 213. In 1973, the ACLU created the Sexual Privacy Project in order to
challenge government regulation of sexuality. Cain, supra note 9, at 1584. By 1975, over half
the states had nullified their sodomy laws. IRONS, supra note 70, at 385. In 1983, the ACLU
teamed up with the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund to host a national meeting of
lesbian and gay legal organizations in order to develop a strategy for attacking sodomy laws.
LAMBDA UPDATE 3 (LAMBDA LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATION FUND) Feb. 1984.
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years in the hopes of finding a case like Hardwick's.74 The fact pattern
seemed ideal. Hardwick had not engaged in sexual activity "in the pres-
ence of strangers" 75 or kept his "windows and doors open to the whole
world."76 Officer Torick had arrested him for behavior occurring in the
privacy of his own home, "a sanctuary to which... the [Constitution]
accords special protection."77 And Hardwick, unlike other potential de-
fendants, had a supportive family and did not fear the loss of his job if he
became involved in a gay rights case.78
On March 31, 1986, Michael E. Hobbs, representing the State of
Georgia, and Laurence H. Tribe, representing Michael Hardwick, argued
the case before the United States Supreme Court. Professor Tribe, a
Harvard law professor and one of the preeminent constitutional law
scholars in the country, had appeared before the Court more than a dozen
times79 and had an impressive record.80 He contended that "private, con-
sensual, adult sexual acts partake of the traditionally revered liberties of
intimate association and individual autonomy" protected by the Constitu-
tion.8' Six decades of privacy precedent, according to Professor Tribe,
mandated an outcome that favored Hardwick.82 At the close of oral argu-
ments, the Hardwick team could taste victory. They were sure they
would win.8 3 But the Supreme Court, focusing its inquiry narrowly on
the sexual intimacy between same-sex couples,84 found that the penum-
bral right to privacy elucidated in prior case law did not extend to homo-
74 IRONs, supra note 70, at 396-97 ("mhey'd been trying for five years to get a perfect
case").
75 Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 547 (1987); cf. Smayda v. United
States, 352 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1965) (sexual activity in a public toilet stall not constitutionally
protected), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 981 (1966); Britt v. Superior Court, 374 P.2d 817 (Cal.
1962) (Constitution requires dismissal of charge where observer viewed two men engaging in
consensual sexual activity through a vent in the ceiling of a department store toilet).
76 Rotary Int'l, 481 U.S. at 547. Many sodomy charges result from behavior that occurs
in public or semi-public areas. See IRoNs, supra note 70, at 396-97.
77 TRIBE, supra note 70, at 1434 (footnotes omitted).
78 "1 was fortunate enough to have a supportive family who knew I was gay. I'm a
bartender, so I can always work in a gay bar. And I was arrested in my own house. So I was a
perfect test case." IRONs, supra note 70, at 397 (in the words of Michael Hardwick).
79 Id. at 388.
80 Id.
81 TRIBE, supra note 70, at 1428.
82 See id. at 1422-23.
83 IRONS, supra note 70, at 399-400 (presenting Michael Hardwick's account of March
31, 1986-the day on which the Court heard oral arguments).
84 The Georgia statute at issue in Hardwick nowhere mentions the word "homosexual,"
and briefs for Hardwick argued in terms of a fundamental right to privacy in intimate associa-
tions, not in terms of "a fundamental right . . . [for] homosexuals to engage in sodomy."
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986) (White, J., writing for the majority).
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sexual sodomy. 85 In the words of Michael Hardwick, "Nobody expected
it."
86
Bowers v. Hardwick, the most important gay rights case ever to
reach the Supreme Court, thus ended in defeat for the claimants. The
case also struck a legal blow so severe to the lesbian, gay and bisexual
community that it has not yet recovered. 87 Hardwick forecloses the appli-
cation of strict scrutiny in the substantive due process arena, forcing pro-
gay litigators to avoid privacy claims in challenges to anti-gay laws and
to focus instead on the Equal Protection Clause. By grounding their argu-
ments against discriminatory laws on equal protection, rather than on due
process, advocates of gay rights hope to carve out a constitutional niche
in which courts will apply strict or intermediate scrutiny to laws that
unfairly burden homosexuals. But this strategy may not successfully by-
pass the Hardwick holding. "Since Hardwick was decided," according to
Professor Nan Hunter,
the threshold question in the litigation of lesbian and gay
rights cases has become whether Hardwick only extin-
guishes the claim to a substantive due process privacy
right, or whether it also predetermines challenges under
the Equal Protection clause. The courts must still decide
whether the decision in Hardwick was a ruling on con-
duct or a ruling on a class of people.88
85 Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 191. Commentators have argued that the issue in Hardwick
should have been controlled by Griswold and Eisenstadt on the theory that a heterosexual
person using birth control has no more connection to procreation than did Michael Hardwick
and his companion. GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUnONAL LAW 974-76 (2d ed. 1991);
see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965).
86 IRONS, supra note 70, at 400. Michael Hardwick describes the day he learned of the
Supreme Court's decision: "A friend of mine had been watching cable news and had [seen a
report of the Court's decision] .... When I opened the door he was crying and saying that he
was sorry, and I didn't know what the hell he was talking about. Finally I calmed him down
and he told me what had happened: that I had lost by a five-to-four vote.
I was totally stunned.... I just cried-not so much because I had failed but because to
me it was frightening to think that in the year of 1986 our Supreme Court.. . could make a
decision that was more suitable to the mentality of the Spanish Inquisition." Il Hardwick
describes calling his attorneys, Kathy Wilde, of the ACLU, and Professor Tribe, looking for
some encouraging words. Professor Tribe "was more devastated than [Hardwick] was." Id.
Newsweek magazine printed a poll that said fifty-seven percent of the population opposed the
decision. Id. at 401.
87 In the opinion of this writer, the queer community will not recover from Hardwick
until the Supreme Court overrules it.
88 Nan D. Hunter, LifeAflerHardwick, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 531,531-32 (1992).
If litigators distinguish status from conduct, courts might reject the argument that homosexuals
as a class are wholly defined by potentially-criminal conduct. Thus, they might apply height-
ened scrutiny to anti-gay laws even though the Hardwick Court used a rational basis review.
See infra § I(C).
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Several federal courts have held that Hardwick does bar heightened
scrutiny, even in the equal protection context. Because states may consti-
tutionally criminalize sodomy, they reason, "[i]t would be quite anoma-
lous, on its face, to declare status defined by [that] conduct . .. as
deserving of strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause."8 9 Other
courts, and numerous commentators, on the other hand, have reached the
opposite conclusion. They argue that courts may apply strict scrutiny to
anti-gay laws challenged under the Equal Protection Clause without run-
ning afoul of the Hardwick mandate because (1) Hardwick dealt solely
with a substantive due process claim; and (2) Hardwick dealt with con-
duct instead of status.90 The Supreme Court's opinion in Romer v. Evans
did not end this debate.91 Because the Court utilized a rational basis test
in striking down the amendment at issue in that case, it left open ques-
tions about the possibility of strict or intermediate scrutiny in other gay
rights cases.
In Romer, the Court squarely confronted-and hopefully cur-
tailed-the newest threat to the civil rights of lesbian, gay and bisexual
people: the anti-gay initiative.92 During the last two decades, the queer
community has secured the passage of anti-discrimination laws or poli-
cies in 119 localities and in at least twenty states, including the District
of Columbia.93 During that same period, however, religious and political
89 Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see also, e.g., Woodward v.
United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1003 (1990).
90 See, e.g., Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699,716-20 (9th Cir. 1989) (Nor-
ris, J., concurring), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 957 (1990); Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati,
Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417, 439-40 (S.D. Ohio 1994), affd in part, vacated in
part, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995), vacated, 116 S. Ct. 2519 (1996) (remanding in light of
Romer, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996)); Jantz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543, 1546-51 (D. Kan. 1991),
rev'd on other grounds, 976 F.2d 623 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2445 (1993);
High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Off., 668 F. Supp. 1361, 1371-72 (N.D. Cal.
1987), rev'd, 909 F.2d 375, 379-80 (9th Cir. 1990) (Canby & Norris, JJ., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc); Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1350 (Colo. 1994), aff'd, 116 S.
Ct. 1620 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the
Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. Cm. L. REv. 1161, 1168
(1988); see also generally Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protec-
tion for Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REv. 915 (1989) (arguing that courts
should apply heightened scrutiny to certain state actions directed at lesbian, gay and bisexual
people).
91 Compare Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1631 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) with
Id. at 1623-29 (Kennedy, I., writing for the majority). The Court did have the opportunity to
end this debate, however. David G. Savage, A Difficult Issue Returns: The Court Gets Set to
Hear Arguments over Gay Rights in Colorado Case, 81 A.B.A. J. 38, 38 (Sept. 1995).
92 I call this the "newest" threat not because the initiative process has never been used
against the queer community before (it has: e.g., California's Proposition Six in 1977), but
because it seems to be the current weapon of choice among homophobes.
93 See Note, Constitutional Limits on Anti-Gay-Rights Initiatives, 106 HARV. L. REv.
1905, 1923-25 (1993) (reproducing data from the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force Policy
Institute).
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conservatives have fought against extensions of civil rights protection to
homosexuals. In fact, they have successfully placed plebiscites on the
ballot in approximately thirty-eight of the communities that had adopted
gay-protective laws. And they have experienced victory in thirty-four of
those communities.94 In 1992, for example, voters approved anti-gay ini-
tiatives or referenda in Colorado, Florida, Maine, Ohio, and Oregon. 95
These initiatives typically begin with a group of citizens placing a
measure on the ballot by securing a specified number of signatures. 96 At
election time, the public votes either for or against the measure; it be-
comes law if more than half the voters favor it. Colorado's Amendment
Two, 97 approved by a fifty-three percent margin,98 typifies such an initia-
tive. 99 It reads:
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its
branches or departments, nor any of its agencies, polit-
ical subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall
94 Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417,
439 (S.D. Ohio 1994), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995), vacated, 116
S. Ct. 2519 (1996) (remanding in light of Romer, 116 S. Ct.1620 (1996)). This pattern-the
passage of anti-discrimination laws followed by initiatives designed to undermine them-par-
allels the experience of the African-American community. The successful passage of state
laws forbidding discrimination in housing and employment provoked a conservative backlash
characterized by initiatives striking in their similarity to the recent initiatives directed at the
lesbian, gay and bisexual community. See infra §§ I(C) (1), I(C) (2).
95 See Suzanne Goldberg, "A Sack of Stones for Throwing": Ballot Measures and the
Right Wing Assault on Lesbian and Gay Civil Rights, LAMBDA UPDATE (LAMBDA LEGAL DE-
FENSE AND EDUCATION FUND), Fall 1993, at 1, 1; Craig C. Burke, Fencing Out Politically
Unpopular Groups from the Normal Political Process: The Equal Protection Concerns of
Colorado's Amendment Two, 69 IND. LJ. 275, 275 (1993).
96 According to the Constitution of the State of Colorado, a citizen must obtain signa-
tures from registered voters equal to at least five percent of the number of votes cast for all
candidates for the office of secretary of state in the last general election. CoLo. CONST. art. V,
§ 1 cl. 2.
97 "Amendment Two" is a bit of a misnomer. The measure would have actually become
Section 30 of the Bill of Rights to the state constitution. It would have amended Article II
Section 2 of that document. It was the second listed initiative on the ballot in November of
1992. Evans v. Romer, 60 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 41, 998 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Jan. 15), aff'd, 854
P.2d 1270, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 959 (1993).
98 53.4% of the voters favored Amendment Two; 46.6% opposed it. Evans v. Romer,
854 P.2d 1270, 1272 (Colo.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 959 (1993).
99 According to Suzanne Goldberg, attorney for Lambda Legal Defense and Education
Fund, three types of anti-gay initiatives presently exist. The first type, like Colorado's Amend-
ment Two, explicitly mentions lesbian, gay and bisexual people. The second type, which Pro-
fessor William Adams calls the "stealth measure," does not. Instead, a stealth measure lists
certain categories upon which people cannot discriminate-e.g., race, color, religion, sex, age,
and handicap-and expressly limits future protection to those categories listed. (Sexual orien-
tation, of course, is absent from the list.) The third and most recent generation of anti-gay
initiatives base their exclusion of lesbian, gay and bisexual people on sexual behavior in an
effort to utilize the Hardwick holding. Suzanne Goldberg & William Adams, Address at the
American Association of Law Schools Conference (Jan. 6, 1995). For a discussion of Hard-
wick, see infra § I(A) (3).
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enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance
or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual ori-
entation, conduct, practices or relationships shall consti-
tute or otherwise be the basis of, or entitle any person or
class of persons to have or claim any minority status,
quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimi-
nation. This Section of the Constitution shall be in all
respects self-executing 100
If Amendment Two had become law, lesbian, gay and bisexual people
would have had no legal recourse from discrimination in housing, em-
ployment, or other areas. They could have secured the passage of gay-
protective legislation only by first amending their state constitution. To*
do so would have required a supermajority of votes in their state legisla-
ture; 0 1 a constitutional convention; n02 or an appeal to the same demo-
cratic body that had truncated their rights in the first place. 10 3 Other
groups could secure the passage of protective legislation by garnishing
the support of a simple majority of their legislators-a much easier
task.'04
These events never came to pass, however, because on October 11,
1994, the Colorado Supreme Court permanently enjoined the state from
enforcing Amendment Two, holding that it violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
According to the court, Amendment Two would have interfered with the
fundamental right of lesbian, gay and bisexual people to "participate
equally in the political process."' 0 5 A federal district court in Ohio ap-
plied similar reasoning to invalidate an anti-gay initiative approved by
Cincinnati voters.' 06 But the threat to gay civil rights continued. In 1994,
100 Evans, 854 P.2d at 1272.
101 Repealing an amendment to the state constitution would have required a 2/3 majority
in both houses and subsequent ratification by a majority of the voters. COLO. CONsT. amend.
XIX, § 2 cl. 1.
102 Id. § 1.
103 Citizens could always use the initiative process to amend their state constitution again,
repealing a previously-enacted anti-gay amendment. See, e.g., John F. Niblock, Comment,
Anti-Gay Initiatives: A Call for Heightened Judicial Scrutiny, 41 UCLA L. R-v. 153, 163-64
(1993).
104 Winning the support of a majority of voters in any given jurisdiction "is a far more
onerous task" than lobbying a legislative body. Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v.
City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417, 428 (S.D. Ohio 1994), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 54
F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995), vacated, 116 S. Ct. 2519 (1996) (remanding in light of Romer, 116 S.
Ct. 1620 (1996)) (referring to the testimony of Guy Guckenberger, who had been a member of
the Cincinnati City Council for over twenty years and was, at the time of his testimony, a
County Commissioner in Hamilton County, Ohio), rev'd, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995); see also
infra § I(C) (2).
105 Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1339 (Colo. 1994) aff'd, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
106 Equality Found., 860 F. Supp. at 433-34. In 1993, voters had approved by initiative a
proposed amendment to the Charter of the City of Cincinnati, popularly known as "Issue
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citizens' groups attempted to place anti-gay measures on the ballots in
nine states.107 Oregon voters considered anti-gay amendments to their
state constitution for three consecutive years, and the Oregon Citizens'
Alliance successfully introduced thirty-three anti-gay initiatives at the
city and county level. 10 8 In Florida, the American Family Association
promised to introduce anti-gay proposals at local levels throughout the
state.109 Against this backdrop, Lambda Legal Defense and Education
Fund (Lambda) attorney Suzanne Goldberg observed that (despite the
Colorado Supreme Court's ruling in Evans v. Romer) "anti-gay initia-
tives have not disappeared and more are expected to emerge in local, if
not statewide, contests."110
Thus, the struggle against anti-gay discrimination, begun in the
early 1900s, endures. Lesbian, gay and bisexual people continue to oper-
ate in a cultural climate characterized by the pervasive vilification of
homosexuality. Anti-gay prejudice remains an accepted form of bigotry
at every level of American society; it begins in the home' and emanates
Three." The proposed amendment read in relevant part as follows: "The City of Cincinnati
and its various Boards and Commissions may not enact, adopt, enforce or administer any
ordinance, regulation, rule or policy which provides that homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual ori-
entation, status, conduct, or relationship constitutes, entitles, or otherwise provides a person
with the basis to have any claim of minority or protected status, quota preference or other
preferential treatment.... Any ordinance, regulation, rule or policy enacted before this amend-
ment is adopted that violates the foregoing prohibition shall be null and void and of no force or
effect." Id. at 422.
107 Suzanne Goldberg, Countering the Agenda of the Radical Right, LAMBDA UPDATE
(LAMBDA LEGAL DEFENsE AND EDUCATION FUND), Fall 1994, at 4, 5. The nine states were:
Arizona, Florida, Idaho, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, Nevada, Oregon and Washington. Id. at
5, 23; Goldberg, supra note 95, at 1, 1. Only two of the ten survived to election day: those in
Idaho and in Oregon. Id., at 5, 23. The majority of Idaho voters opposed the anti-gay initiative
on their ballot. Sara Pursley, We Recruit, Z MAO., Jan. 1995, at 15.
108 See Docket Update, LAMBDA UPDATE (LAMBDA LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION
FUND), Fall 1994, at 10, 11; Docket Update, LAMBDA UPDATE (LAMBDA LEGAL DEFENSE AND
EDUCATION FUND), Fall 1993, at 8, 8.
109 Lambda Program Activities, LAMBDA UPDATE (LAMBDA LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCA-
TION FUND), Fall 1994, at 23, 23.
110 Goldberg, supra note 107 at 4-5.
111 When we engage in private, consensual sexual activity in our homes, for instance, we
are vulnerable to arrest and punishment. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196
(1986). And gay teenagers face rejection by parents and peers. See, e.g., Amelia Craig, The
Kindness of Strangers: A Lesbian and Gay Youth Detention Center in Utah, LAMBDA UPDATE
(LAMBDA LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND), Fall 1993, at 4, 4 (describing allegations by
two youths that their parents sent them to an institution in Utah in order to "de-gay" them);
RICHARD POSBR, SEx AND REASON 308 (1992) ("[I]f the hypothetical cure for homosexuality
were something that could be administered-costlessly, risklessly, without side effects-
before a child had become aware of his homosexual propensity, you can be sure that the
child's parents would administer it to him, believing, probably correctly, that he would be
better off."). According to Judge Posner, tolerance of homosexuality would aid parents in
identifying homosexual tendencies in their children so that they would not "condone 'sissyish'
behavior in infancy," thus making it "difficult for [their] little boy to become properly boyish."
Id. at 308-09.
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outward into work,112 religion, 113 politicsll4 and law.115 According to
Professor Jane Schacter:
Gay men and lesbians live in a regime of formal inequal-
ity, where it is lawful to deny people employment, hous-
ing, and access to public accommodations solely because
of their sexual orientation under the law of all but eight
states. Gay men and lesbians cannot marry in any state,
have restricted parenting rights in most states, are sub-
ject to criminal prosecution for consensual sexual activ-
ity in almost half of the states, may not serve openly
(and perhaps not even in the closet) in the military, and
suffer numerous other restrictions. Anti-gay violence,
moreover, is dramatically on the rise.116
112 See supra § I(A) (1); see also, e.g., Doe v. Gates, 981 F.2d 1316, 1318 (D.C. Cir.
1993) (upholding the CIA's dismissal of a gay employee on the basis of his sexual orienta-
tion); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 102-04 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (upholding the FBI's dismissal
of a lesbian employee on the basis of her sexual orientation); Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d
1388, 1396-98 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (upholding the Army's dismissal of a homosexual service
member based on his sexual orientation). The dismissal of lesbian and gay employees is not
limited to national security jobs. In the early 1990s, for example, the management of the
Cracker Barrel restaurant chain attempted to fire all of its lesbian and gay employees. See, e.g.,
Bob Cohn, Discrimination: The Limits of the Law, NEwswEEK, Sept. 14, 1992, at 38. And the
nation's schools suffer from anti-gay prejudice as well. In November of 1994, for instance, a
poster pinned to the bulletin board outside a classroom at Cornell Law School, purporting to
educate voters about an openly-lesbian candidate for New York State Attorney General, said:
"Attention Voters: NYS Attorney General candidate Karen Burstein is a known whore: guilty
of Sodomy/Incest/Rape's equivalent/Treason; an avowed Satanist! (also) [sic]." On file with
the author.
113 See, e.g., D'EMm.o, SEXUAL Por.rrics, supra note 29, at 13.
114 See, e.g., Bob Bauman, The Man Who Talked Too Much, N.Y. Trams, Feb. 4, 1995, at
19 (discussing congressman Dick Armey's reference to his openly-gay colleague, congress-
man Barney Frank, as "Barney Fag").
115 See generally Cain, supra note 9 (presenting a legal history of the struggle for gay
civil rights).
116 Jane S. Schacter, The Gay Civil Rights Debate in the States: Decoding the Discourse
of Equivalents, 29 HAiv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 283, 298 (1993) (footnotes omitted). "Other re-
strictions... include discrimination in insurance, credit, and employment and tax benefits
granted to married heterosexual couples but not to [committed] homosexual couples." Id. But
see Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 48 (Haw. 1993) (holding that laws denying marriage licenses
to same-sex couples violate the Equal Protection Clause of the state constitution) (on remand
to the trial court); Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 309 (D.C. Ct. App. 1994)
(challenging laws that restrict the right to marry to heterosexual couples). For examples of
anti-gay violence, see CRUInsHANK, supra note 10, at 84 (discussing an incident that took
place in 1990 in which a man shot and killed a lesbian while she and her lover were camping
along the Appalachian trail after having tracked the women for an entire day); Jeffrey S.
Byrne, Affirmative Action for Lesbians and Gay Men: A Proposal for True Equality of Oppor-
tunity and Workforce Diversity, 11 YALE L. & PoL'Y REv. 47, 64 n.231 (1993) (describing a
1992 incident in which the shipmates of a gay sailor who had just come out to his commanding
officer beat him to death in a public restroom); Christopher Muther, Annual Local, National
Violence Stats Rise Again, BAY WINDows, Mar. 11, 1993, at 1 (describing a 1993 incident in
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At the same time, lesbian, gay and bisexual individuals can disclose
their sexual orientation perhaps more easily than ever before, and the
existence of legal defense organizations such as Lambda,1 17 and of gay-
protective laws throughout the country, indicate that the queer commu-
nity has made significant gains since the days of Henry Gerber's Society
for Human Rights. Although the Hardwick decision crippled an emerg-
ing gay rights jurisprudence based on privacy and autonomy, cases like
Evans and Romer1t 8 signal that the Equal Protection Clause might pro-
vide a viable alternative to substantive due process arguments. The next
subsection presents the legal context in which the Colorado Supreme
Court decided Evans, providing an overview of the equal protection doc-
trine so important to the current gay rights struggle.
B. AN EQUAL PROTECTION PRIMER
Equal protection occupies a role so central in constitutional jurispru-
dence that it cannot be said to spring only from the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment itself.' 19 Although that Clause pro-
vides that "[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall ... deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws," the
guarantee of equal justice under the law comes also from the Due Pro-
cess Clauses of the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments; it comes from
the body of the Constitution; and in matters of race, it comes from the
Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. 120 Some scholars believe equal
protection is so crucial a guarantee that it serves as a guardian of virtu-
ally all constitutional freedoms. 121
What does "equal protection of the laws" mean? At minimum, it
means that government cannot enact legislation except to further some
legitimate state interest. 122 And it requires that the means chosen to fur-
ther that interest relate rationally to the desired end.123 Thus, government
cannot create legal distinctions between similarly situated individuals be-
which the neighbor of a lesbian couple shot and killed the women because he was "upset by
[their] open displays of affection.").
117 Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund is a not-for-profit public interest organiza-
tion founded in 1973 to advance the rights of lesbian, gay and bisexual people through test-
case litigation and public education. LAMBDA UPDATE (LAMBDA LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCA-
TION FuND), Fall 1994, at 2, 2.
118 This Note uses "Evans" to describe the case as it was litigated in the Colorado
Supreme Court and "Romer" to describe the case during its appellate review at the United
States Supreme Court.
119 TRIBE, supra note 70, at 1436-37.
120 Id. at 1437.
121 Id. at 1436.
122 Id. at 1440.
123 Id.
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cause such distinctions are unreasonable. 124 It cannot, for example, class-
ify citizens as eligible or ineligible to attend a certain public school based
on their race.'2 In addition, government cannot, absent a "compelling"
state interest, distribute benefits or burdens in a manner that interferes
with the exercise of, or access to, a fundamental right.
126
This subsection describes four elements of equal protection doc-
trine. First, it describes the requirement of state action, in which a chal-
lenger must show that the government, or an actor sufficiently like the
government, has discriminated unreasonably against some group. Sec-
ond, it defines rational basis review, the ordinary, deferential manner in
which courts review challenged laws. Third, it discusses the existence of
suspect classifications which automatically trigger a more rigorous stan-
dard than a mere rational basis review. Finally, it describes what happens
if a challenged law implicates a fundamental interest.
1. State Action
The Equal Protection Clause applies to both the state and federal
government through the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments, respec-
tively. 127 It does not apply to private action. Thus an equal protection
challenge requires at the outset a showing that state action is involved in
the discriminatory classification. Laws that depend on government for
their implementation-through police, prosecutors or the judiciary-
have passed this hurdle with varying degrees of ease. 128 Even civil suits
can involve state action. In Palmore v. Sidoti,12 9 for example, the di-
vorced father of a white, three-year-old girl sought custody of the child
when her mother married an African-American man. Acknowledging the
possibility that the girl might suffer social stigmatization due to prejudice
against inter-racial marriage, the Court unanimously ruled that such con-
siderations could not constitute a valid ground for a custody decision:
"The Constitution cannot control such prejudices but neither can it toler-
ate them. Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law
cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect."'
30
124 Id. at 1438, 1440; see also STONE, supra note 85, at 536.
125 TRIBE, supra note 70, at 1438.
126 Id. at 1454.
127 U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
128 See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19 (1948) (holding that judicial enforcement
of a racially restrictive covenant involved the state in a "denial of equal protection of the
laws"); see also THEODORE EISENBERG, Crvm RIGHTS LEGISLATION: CASES AND MATERIALS
86-89 (3d ed. 1981) (discussing state action); STONE, supra note 85, at 1593 (same).
129 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
130 Id at 433.
1996]
450 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PuBLIc POLICY
2. Rational Basis Review
Once a court resolves the preliminary question regarding the exist-
ence of state action, it must determine the appropriate standard of review
to apply to the challenged law. Courts do not overturn every law that
treats some group differently. In most cases, they defer to legislatures:
"[t]he general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be
sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to
a legitimate state interest."'1 31 In other words, courts normally analyze a
challenged law with a rational basis review. They hesitate to invalidate
laws created by the political branches because of their own attenuation
from the democratic process and because of the legislature's superior
ability to engage in the detailed, policy-based fact-finding necessary for
statutory enactments. Almost every classification survives a rational ba-
sis review.
132
Under some circumstances, however, courts will apply this level of
review with "bite." 133 This type of rational basis review might give rise
to an invalidation of the challenged law for any of three reasons. First, a
court might characterize as "illegitimate" the government's purported in-
terest in enacting the challenged measure. For example, in Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. v. Ward,134 the Supreme Court found that an Alabama stat-
ute taxing out-of-state insurance companies at a higher rate than domes-
tic insurance companies in order to "promot[e] the business
of... domestic insurers.., by penalizing foreign insurers" 135 violated
the Equal Protection Clause. According to the Court, the government's
objective was "not a legitimate state purpose." 136 It struck down the stat-
ute while applying only a rational basis review. Second, a court might
find irrational-the means chosen to achieve a given, legitimate interest. In
applying a rational basis review to an employment discrimination statute
in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 13 7 for instance, the Supreme Court
held that denying the state's Fair Employment Practices Commission ju-
risdiction over any claim they failed to process within 120 days did not
rationally relate to expediting dispute resolution-the government's prof-
fered objective.138 The Court invalidated the state law.
131 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
132 STONE, supra note 85, at 4541; TRIBE, supra note 70, at 1442-43.
133 Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Forward: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HAv. L. Rnv. 1,
20-24 (1972).
134 470 U.S. 869 (1985).
135 Id. at 877.
136 Id. at 880. Note that there was a strong dissent in this case in which Justices
O'Connor, Brennan, Marshall and Rehnquist joined. See id. at 883-902.
137 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
138 Id. at 433.
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Finally, a court might find that the measure in question has at its
foundation an improper purpose.139 Certain classifications, although not
suspect or semi-suspect, 140 still give rise to a probability that bias was
involved in their creation. In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center,141 the Supreme Court struck down a Texas measure requiring a
special use permit for the operation of a group home for the mentally
retarded. Although mental retardation does not constitute a suspect or
semi-suspect classification, the Court characterized the challenged classi-
fication as based on an improper purpose. In short, the Court said,
"the... [classification] in this case appears to us to rest on an irrational
prejudice against the mentally retarded... ."142 Similarly, in U.S. Dept.
of Agriculture v. Moreno,143 the Court struck down a portion of the Food
Stamp Act of 1964 designed to "exclude[ ] from participation in the food
stamp program any household containing an individual who is unrelated
to any other member of the household."'144 It found improper the possible
desire on the part of Congress to exclude "hippie communes" from the
federal food stamp program. 145 Thus, courts may invalidate legislation
aimed at politically unpopular groups, even when engaged in a rational
basis review, by piercing the government's proffered interest in order to
reveal a hostile purpose.
3. Strict and Intermediate Scrutiny
In some equal protection cases, however, courts cannot engage in a
mere rational basis review. They must apply "intermediate scrutiny," in
which they uphold a challenged law only if its classification relates "sub-
stantially" to an "important" governmental objective, or they must apply
"strict scrutiny," in which they uphold the challenged law only if its im-
plementation is "necessary" to promote a "compelling" governmental in-
terest. 146 Strict scrutiny is almost always fatal to a challenged law.147
139 The rule against improper purposes in Equal Protection Doctrine essentially means
that "if you ask the state what purpose it is achieving by treating a group differently, the state
can't answer, 'We want to treat that group differently."' The state cannot, in other words, "turn
the classification into the purpose." Matthew Coles, Equal Protection and the Anti-Civil-
Rights Initiatives: Protecting the Ability of Lesbians and Gay Men to Bargain in the Pluralist
Bazaar, 55 Omo ST. LJ. 563, 566 (1994).
140 See infra § I(B) (3).
141 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
142 Id. at 450.
143 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
144 Id. at 529.
145 Id. at 543.
146 See, e.g., TRiBE, supra note 70, at §§ 16-26, 16-6.
147 Id. at 1451 (citing Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Forward: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARV. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972)).
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In certain circumstances, then, courts will abandon their deferential
role vis-a-vis the legislature and subject challenged laws to heightened
scrutiny. This process acknowledges the majority's inability to make cer-
tain political choices-such as those that would harm minority popula-
tions-even if many people feel strongly inclined to do so. 148 Laws that
demonstrate "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities"'149 auto-
matically trigger strict scrutiny, the most demanding level of review.
Classifications based on race, national origin and sometimes on alienage,
therefore, constitute inherently suspect classes. Laws distinguishing on
those bases receive the most stringent review. In order to justify such a
law, the government must produce more than just a legitimate or even an
important state interest. It must produce a compelling interest.' 50 And it
must prove that the challenged law is necessary to further that interest;
the means/end relationship must, in other words, be perfect.
Intermediate scrutiny, a less stringent level of review poised some-
where between rational basis review and strict scrutiny, applies to "semi-
suspect classifications," like those made on the basis of gender and ille-
gitimacy. In order to justify laws that discriminate on these bases, the
government must produce an important state interest and, although the
means/end relationship need not be perfect, the means must substantially
further the desired end.
4. Fundamental Interests
Just as the majority cannot make choices that would harm certain
underrepresented groups, it likewise cannot make choices that would
burden fundamental interests. In his famous footnote four of United
States v. Carolene Products Co., Justice Stone observed that "legislation
which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected
to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, [may] be subjected to
more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the
Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation."' 51
Courts will therefore depart from their ordinary rational basis review and
will analyze laws challenged under the Equal Protection Clause with
strict scrutiny if they implicate the fundamental interest in equal voting
opportunity. 152 In order to salvage such a law, the government would
148 RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 133 (1977).
149 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
150 In the much-criticized case of Korematsu v. United States, for example, the Supreme
Court upheld the large-scale internment of Japanese Americans during World War II on the
theory that there existed a "compelling" state interest in the prevention of espionage and sabo-
tage by those persons. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217 (1944).
151 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 & n.4 (1938).
152 See e.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986) (observing that gerrymandering
may violate the Equal Protection Clause where it in fact disadvantages members of the
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need to demonstrate that its implementation is necessary to further a
compelling state interest.
Courts will strictly scrutinize laws implicating other fundamental
interests, as well, such as the right to interstate travel,153 the right to have
access to the judicial process, 154 and the right to make independent deci-
sions about procreation. 55 They identify fundamental interests by refer-
ence to history and tradition; precedent, for example, plays a major role
in determining what constitutes a "fundamental" right. 156 In Palko v.
Connecticut, Justice Cardozo described fundamental interests as those
"principle[s] of justice [so] rooted in the tradition and conscience of our
people" that citizens view them as "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty."157 Without these interests, he wrote, "neither liberty nor justice
would exist."' 58
C. Equal Protection Challenges to Anti-Gay Initiatives in the
State Courts
Prior to May of 1996, two courts-the Evans court in Colorado and
the Equality Foundation court in Ohio-had invalidated anti-gay initia-
tives on equal protection grounds. 159 Both courts found that the chal-
lenged laws, if enforced, would have burdened the fundamental interest
of lesbian, gay and bisexual people to participate equally in the political
targeted party); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (invalidating
a state law restricting participation in school district elections to property-owning parents of
school-age children); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966) (striking
down a state poll tax); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (overturning a state law
resulting in an inequal distribution of the right to vote); TRIBE, supra note 70, at § 16-10
(discussing equal voting opportunity as a fundamental right).
153 See, e.g., Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); TPmun, supra note 70, at § 16-8.
154 See TRIBE, supra note 70, at § 16-11 (discussing a "[r]ight to [e]qual [1]itigation
[ojpportunity" as fundamental).
155 The right to make independent decisions about procreation actually emanates from the
overall fundamental interest in privacy or, as Professor Tribe describes it, the interest in mak-
ing "intimate personal choices." Id. § 16-7.
156 See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-94 (1986) (analyzing Hardwick's
claim in light of precedent and tradition); see also Pamela Coukos, Civil Rights and Special
Wrongs - The Amendment 2 Litigation, 29 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. RE,. 581, 588 (1994); Sun-
stein, supra note 90, at 1172-73 (discussing the use of tradition in privacy analysis).
157 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-326 (1937) (citing, among others, Snyder v.
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
158 Id. at 326.
159 Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417, 449
(S.D. Ohio 1994), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995), vacated, 116 S.
Ct. 2519 (1996) (remanding in light of Romer, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996)); Evans v. Romer, 882
P.2d 1335, 1350 (Colo. 1994), afftd, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996). This Note refers to the Sixth
Circuit decision reversing the district court decision as "Equality Foundation (2)." The
Supreme Court's ruling in Romer v. Evans, of course, undermines the holding of Equality
Foundation (2) and revives part of the lower court's analysis in that case.
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process. 160 Thus, both courts engaged in strict scrutiny reviews. 161 Ac-
cording to the Evans court, "[t]he state . . . failed to establish that
Amendment 2 [was] necessary to serve any compelling governmental
interest in a narrowly tailored way."'1 62 Its decision was based entirely on
a fundamental rights analysis.
163
The Equality Foundation court, in contrast, offered two additional
and independent rationale for its equal protection holding. 64 First, it
concluded that laws discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation con-
stitute semi-suspect classifications.1 65 Thus, it reviewed "Issue Three" (a
proposed amendment to Cincinnati's City Charter that substantially re-
sembles Colorado's Amendment Two 166) with intermediate scrutiny. It
found that the measure was not "substantially tailored to a sufficiently
important governmental interest."' 167 Second, it found that Issue Three
failed even a rational basis review.' 68 According to Judge Spiegel, "we
can conceive of no legitimate governmental purpose rationally related to
a law which prohibits a minority group from ever obtaining anti-discrim-
ination legislation on its behalf ... .-"169 The court therefore held Issue
Three unconstitutional "under even the most deferential standard of re-
view, let alone the most exacting."' 170 The Sixth Circuit subsequently re-
versed its decision. 1
71
This subsection explores the reasoning in Evans and Equality Foun-
dation by first describing how anti-gay initiatives involve state action; by
second discussing the fundamental interest analysis conducted by both
courts; by third evaluating whether or not laws aimed at gay, lesbian, and
bisexual people can constitute suspect or semi-suspect classifications;
and by finally presenting the rational basis analysis under which the
Equality Foundation court invalidated Issue Three. Finally, the subsec-
tion discusses Justice Scott's Evans concurrence, in which he argues for
160 Equality Found., 860 F. Supp. at 449; Evans, 882 P.2d at 1341 & n.4.
161 Equality Found., 860 F. Supp. at 449; Evans, 882 P.2d at 1341.
162 Evans, 882 P.2d at 1350.
163 See id. at 1339-41.
164 The Equality Foundation court also invalidated Issue Three as violating the plaintiffs'
First Amendment rights to freedom of expression and association, as infringing their First
Amendment right to petition the government for redress of grievances, and as unconstitution-
ally vague. Equality Found., 860 F. Supp. at 449.
165 Id. at 436.
166 Compare id. at 422 with infra text accompanying note 100 (quoting the text of both
initiatives).
167 Equality Found., 860 F. Supp. at 440-44.
168 Id. at 441.
169 Id. at 443.
170 Id. at 444.
171 Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261,271 (6th Cir.
1995) vacated, 116 S. Ct. 2519 (1996) (remanding in light of Romer, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996)).
This holding has, of course, been undermined by the Supreme Court's decision in Romer v.
Evans.
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a revival of the Privileges or Immunities Clause in order to circumvent
limitations in equal protection jurisprudence.
1. State Action Analysis
In Reitman v. Mulkey, 172 the Supreme Court considered a challenge
to a facially neutral amendment to the California State Constitution
popularly known as "Proposition Fourteen."'173 Citizens had passed the
amendment by plebiscite in a statewide election shortly after California
had enacted fair housing laws prohibiting private discrimination on the
basis of race in certain commercial transactions. 174 Proposition Fourteen
would have prohibited the State of California from interfering with "the
right of any person ... to decline to sell, lease or rent ... property to
such person or persons as he,* in his absolute discretion, chooses."'175 It
would have repealed existing anti-discrimination laws and prohibited the
passage of such laws in the future. 176 The proponents of the measure
contended that it placed California in a permissibly neutral position with
regard to private discrimination.177 The amendment did not differ, they
claimed, from a simple repeal of fair housing laws-something the state
could clearly do.178 Proposition Fourteen did nothing more, they con-
tended, than remove government from an area of private conduct prop-
erly immune from state interference. In other words, it simply eliminated
a "state-created impediment upon freedom of choice."'179
The Supreme Court, in a five to four decision, disagreed. Proposi-
tion Fourteen, the majority said, established the right to discriminate as
"one of the basic policies of the State"'180 and made California a "partner
in the ... act of discrimination."'' The measure, according to the Court,
insured that "[t]he right to discriminate, including the right to discrimi-
nate on racial grounds, was ... embodied in the State's basic charter,
immune from legislative, executive, or judicial regulation at any level of
the state government."'1 2 On this reasoning, the Court affirmed a lower
court ruling that Proposition Fourteen unconstitutionally involved the
172 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
173 Id. at 370-71.
174 Id. at 373-74.
175 Id. at 371.
176 Id. at 389 (Harlan, J., writing for the dissent).
177 Id.
178 Id. The events leading up to the litigation in Reitman took place before the passage of
the federal Fair Housing Act. See JEssE DuKEMNIR & JAmES E. KRam, POPmRTY 441 n.15
(3d ed. 1993) (discussing the 1968 enactment of the Fair Housing Act).
179 Reitman, 387 U.S. at 390 (Harlan, J., writing for the dissent).
180 Id. at 381.
181 Id. at 375, 376 (quoting Mulkey v. Reitman, 413 P.2d 825, 834 (Cal. 1966), and
embracing its judgment, respectively).
182 Id. at 377.
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State of California in private discrimination. 183 States cannot, without
running afoul of the Constitution, authorize conduct that would violate
the Fourteenth Amendment if engaged in directly by government. 184
Justice Harlan, however, writing for the dissent, saw California's
involvement in Proposition Fourteen differently. "I believe [that] the
state action required to bring the Fourteenth Amendment into operation
must be affirmative and purposeful, actively fostering discrimination," he
wrote. 185 He viewed the challenged amendment as "a neutral provision
restoring to the sphere of free choice ... private behavior within a lim-
ited area of the racial problem." 186 He feared that the majority's holding
would herald a day in which federal courts could reach "[e]very act of
private discrimination." 18
7
Some commentators have agreed with this position. Professor Theo-
dore Eisenberg, for example, characterizes Reitman v. Mulkey as "It]he
outer limits of . . . state action;" 188 and Professor Richard Epstein de-
scribes it as "one of the most ... controversial decisions of the Warren
Court . ,,.89 Professor Epstein argues that Reitman "obliterate[d] the
public-private distinction" 190 supposedly protected by the state action
doctrine. He believes that the Supreme Court mistakenly characterized
pure inaction as government involvement and, in so doing, improperly
justified the use of federal power to influence private behavior. 191 Justice
Rehnquist took this position when he wrote: "the crux of
[the] . .. complaint [was] not that the State [had] acted, but that it [had]
refused to act."'192
183 Id. at 381. If Proposition Fourteen had been a legislative enactment, instead of an
amendment to the California State Constitution, the outcome would have been the same.
TRIBE, supra note 70, at 48 n.26.
184 Reitman, 387 U.S. at 374 (quoting Mulkey v. Reitman, 413 P.2d 825, 834 (Cal.
1966)).
185 Id. at 395 (Harlan, J., writing for the dissent).
186 Id. at 394 (Harlan, J., writing for the dissent).
187 See id.
188 EISENBERG, supra note 128, at 88-89. He characterizes Hunter v. Erickson, another
case upon which the Evans and Equality Foundation courts depend, in the same way. Id. For a
discussion of Hunter, see infra § I(C) (2) (a).
189 Richard A. Epstein, Caste and the Civil Rights Laws: From Jim Crow to Same-Sex
Marriages, 92 MICH. L. REv. 2456, 2469 (1994); see also STONE, supra note 85, at 1601-14
(discussing state inaction).
190 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 189, at 2470.
191 See id. at 2457, 2470.
192 STONE, supra note 85, at 1610 (quoting Justice Rehnquist in the majority opinion in
Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (holding that no state action was present where a
state statute authorized the sale by private warehouse owners of their clients' property without
meeting the requirements of the Due Process Clause)); see also DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Dept. of Social Serv., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (no state action where Wisconsin social
services had knowledge of, and had intervened several times to remedy, the abuse of Joshua
DeShaney by his father-abuse that eventually resulted in permanent retardation).
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Other commentators argue that government cannot always "acqui-
esce passively"'193 in any given state of affairs. They point out that "many
[widely accepted] equal protection cases can be characterized as involv-
ing state inaction."'194 Some scholars argue further that it would be rea-
sonable to constitutionally "require the state to control the conduct
of ... [private] persons."'195 A private individual's discriminatory treat-
ment of African Americans, for example, may not in itself violate the
Equal Protection Clause, but the state's permissive policy regarding such
discrimination might. 196 The Fourteenth Amendment could be construed
as having created an affirmative duty on the part of government to pro-
tect individual rights. 19
7
The similarity of circumstances in Reitman, Evans, and Equality
Foundation is striking. Amendment Two and Issue Three, like Proposi-
tion Fourteen, appeared in response to the passage of anti-discrimination
laws. 198 Each measure would have repealed that legislation and prohib-
ited the passage of similar legislation in the future. In addition, the pro-
ponents of the anti-gay initiatives, like the proponents of the racially-
discriminatory measure in Reitman, argued that those laws placed gov-
ernment in a permissibly neutral position. 199 The Supreme Court obvi-
ously recognized, in deciding Romer v. Evans without disputing the
presence of state action, that Amendment Two, like Proposition Four-
teen, "[was] a form of sophisticated discrimination whereby the people
of [Colorado] . .. harness[ed] the energies of private groups to do indi-
rectly what they [could not] ...allow their government to do [di-
rectly]." 200 In fact, Romer more clearly involves the state in invidious
discrimination because Amendment Two, in contrast to Proposition
Fourteen, discriminated on its face. 20'
Insofar as the Reitman majority focused its inquiry on the presence
or absence of state action, however-and assumed, with little explana-
tion, that Proposition Fourteen constituted an equal protection viola-
tion-the decision provides little guidance in evaluating the equal
193 See STONE, supra note 85, at 1610.
194 Id.
195 Id. at 1593.
196 See id.
197 See id.
198 Compare supra § I(A) (3) (discussing the events surrounding the passage of recent
anti-gay initiates) with supra § I(C) (1) (discussing the passage of Proposition Fourteen).
199 Coloradoans for Family Values, for example, claimed that Amendment Two "re-
move[d] government from this terribly divisive issue." Defendants-Appellants' Opening Brief
at 49, Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335 (1994) (Nos. 94-SA-048 and 94-SA-128 (consoli-
dated)), aff'd, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996). See also Brief for the ACLU at 13, Evans.
200 Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 383 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring).
201 See infra text accompanying note 100.
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protection issues in Evans. The three cases that follow provide more gui-
dance in that endeavor.
2. Fundamental Interest Analysis
The Evans and Equality Foundation courts (as well as the Romer
Court) assumed that a facially discriminatory amendment to the state
constitution and to the city charter, respectively, involved government
activity; they did not even mention the state action doctrine in their opin-
ions. 202 The courts focused instead on determining whether or not Colo-
rado's Amendment Two and Cincinnati's Issue Three infringed on a
fundamental right in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Utilizing
three core cases, they found that the anti-gay initiatives at issue would
violate the fundamental interest of lesbian, gay and bisexual people to
participate equally in the political process. This subsection traces their
reasoning by examining each of these cases in turn. It concludes by ana-
lyzing a fourth case which might serve to clarify some of the ambiguities
left by the other three.
a. Hunter v. Erickson20
3
In Hunter, the Supreme Court struck down a voter-initiated amend-
ment to the Akron City Charter similar to the one invalidated in Reitman.
Akron voters had adopted the amendment by ballot initiative. It required
popular approval by referendum of any fair housing ordinance enacted
by the Akron City Council that involved "race, color, religion, national
origin or ancestry. ' 204 Citizens had placed the initiative on the ballot in
response to a fair housing ordinance designed to prohibit discrimination
on those very bases. 20
5
The Supreme Court struck down the measure, holding, with only
one dissenting vote, that it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
United States Constitution.20 6 The Court evaluated the proposed amend-
202 Equality Foundation does discuss the idea of state neutrality, but it nowhere mentions
the state action doctrine by name. Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati,
860 F. Supp. 417 (S.D. Ohio 1994), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995),
vacated, 116 S. Ct. 2519 (1996) (remanding in light of Romer, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996)). If a
court ever has occasion to evaluate the constitutionality of a stealth initiative, a finding of state
action may become more difficult. For a definition of "stealth initiative," see supra note 99.
Both Amendment Two and Issue Three discriminated against lesbian, gay and bisexual people
on their faces. If an initiative did not so obviously discriminate, a court would face a situation
in which it had to distinguish between permissible state neutrality and impermissible endorse-
ment of discriminatory practices. See supra text accompanying notes 188-99.
203 Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
204 Id. at 387.
205 See id. at 386. The amendment would have suspended the operation of existing fair
housing laws. "Any such ordinance in effect at the time of the adoption of this section shall
cease to be effective until approved by the electors as provided herein." Id. at 387.
206 Id. at 393.
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ment against the documented history of racial discrimination in Ak-
ron,207 concluding that "although the law on its face treats Negro and
white, Jew and gentile in an identical manner, the reality is that the law's
impact falls on the minority.' '208 Thus the Court characterized the amend-
ment as facially neutral while acknowledging the unique burden it placed
on certain minority groups.2 09 Although fair housing legislation might in
theory prevent discrimination against Anglo Americans as much as it
would against, say, Mexican Americans, the former group does not, in
practice, require such protection. In the words of the Court, "[t]he major-
ity needs no protection against discrimination and if it did, a referendum
might be bothersome but no more than that. '210 The direct beneficiaries
of fair housing legislation of the type targeted by the Akron initiative are
racial, ethnic and religious minorities. The Court noted that the chal-
lenged amendment did not neutrally allocate government power in such a
way as to make it more difficult for every group to enact legislation in its
favor.211 For most groups, passage of an ordinance by the City Council
would suffice.212 But for the groups singled out by the amendment, "[a]
referendum was required .... ,,213 Such a restructuring of the govern-
mental process, according to the Hunter Court, violates the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection: "the State may no more disadvantage any
particular group by making it more difficult to enact legislation in its
behalf than it may dilute any person's vote or give any group a smaller
representation than another of comparable size. '214
What the Akron initiative did under a thin veneer of neutrality, Col-
orado's Amendment Two did in a facially discriminatory manner.215 In
contrast to the initiative at issue in Hunter, Amendment Two explicitly
207 Id. at 391.
208 Id.
209 The Court characterizes the challenged initiative as "an explicitly racial classification"
presumably because that would have been its effect, not because it was facially discriminatory.
See Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 468 (1982); Hunter, 393 U.S. at
389. Note that Justice Harlan and Justice Stewart, who had dissented in Reitman, described the
proposed amendment in Hunter as "discriminatory on its face" and as having the "clear pur-
pose of making it more difficult for certain racial and religious minorities to achieve legisla-
tion ... in their interest." Hunter, 393 U.S. at 395 (Harlan, J., dissenting). For them, the Akron
initiative lacked facial neutrality because it mentioned race, ethnicity and religion on its face.
210 Hunter, 393 U.S. at 391.
211 It did not, for example, require that the people ratify every enactment of the City
Council by referendum.
212 Hunter, 393 U.S. at 390.
213 Id.
214 Id. at 393.
215 Coloradoan's for Family Values-like the citizens' group responsible for the amend-
ment struck down in Hunter-probably drafted (and successfully submitted) the measure in
response to gay-protective legislation on the books in Denver, Boulder, Aspen, and in the
governing laws of several state schools. See Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1284-85 & n.26
(Colo.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 959 (1993).
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discriminated against "homosexual, lesbian or bisexual ' 216 people. It did
not prevent anti-discrimination legislation involving "sexual orientation;"
it expressly prevented anti-discrimination legislation designed to protect
lesbian, gay and bisexual people in particular. Amendment Two singled
out a particular group for special disadvantage in the political process
even more clearly than did the Akron initiative. Divorced people, pet
owners and even heterosexuals could have secured fair housing legisla-
tion after the passage of Amendment Two by a simple majority vote in
their state legislature. The queer community, on the other hand, could
have secured anti-discrimination legislation only by first amending their
state constitution. That would have entailed the far more arduous task of
garnishing a majority of votes in a statewide election; achieving a
supermajority in the state legislature, or rewriting the state
constitution. 2
17
Some commentators attempt to explain Hunter in terms of race.
They argue that the Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny to the Akron
amendment because it discriminated against traditionally suspect
classes.218 The Colorado Supreme Court, however, interpreted Hunter to
speak in terms more broad than those encompassing racial discrimination
alone.219 It pointed out that the Court forbid states from disadvantaging
"any particular group" in its quest for favorable legislation.220 The Court
did not restrict its terms to racial or religious minorities. The Equality
Foundation court agreed. According to Judge Spiegel, Hunter clearly
represents more than just "a routine application of the principle that ra-
cial classifications must be strictly scrutinized. '221 He described the lan-
guage used in Hunter as "unmistakably race-neutral. '222 Both courts,
moreover, pointed out that Hunter relied exclusively on precedent having
to do with voting, and not with cases dealing with racial discrimina-
tion.223 Thus one may reasonably, and perhaps necessarily, interpret
Hunter as something more than a "race case. '"224
216 Id. at 1272; see also supra text accompanying note 100 (quoting the language of
Amendment Two).
217 See supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text (discussing the extra burdens associ-
ated with Amendment Two); see also infra text accompanying notes 228-33.
218 See, e.g., Evans, 854 P.2d at 1297 (Erickson, J., dissenting).
219 Id. at 1279 (majority opinion).
220 Id. (quoting Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 393 (1969)).
221 Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417, 430
(S.D. Ohio 1994), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995), vacated, 116 S.
Ct. 2519 (1996) (remanding in light of Romer, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996)).
222 Id. at 431.
223 Equality Found., 860 F. Supp. at 431; Evans, 854 P.2d at 1279-80.
224 Equality Found., 860 F. Supp. at 431.
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b. Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1225
In Washington, the Supreme Court invalidated yet another statewide
initiative. Initiative 350, the measure at issue, provided that "no school
board . . . shall directly or indirectly require any student to attend a
school other than the school which is geographically nearest or next
nearest the student's place of residence."' 226 A citizens' group had drafted
and successfully introduced Initiative 350 in response to a 1978 decision
by the Seattle School Board to combat racial segregation in elementary
and secondary schools through a mandatory busing policy.2 2 7 The Seattle
School District, along with two other school districts, brought suit
against the State of Washington, claiming that Initiative 350 violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.
The Supreme Court ruled for the plaintiffs, describing Initiative 350
as "subtly distort[ing] governmental processes in such a way as to place
special burdens on the ability of minority groups to achieve beneficial
legislation." 228 The challenged law would have passed constitutional
muster if it had allocated political power according to neutral princi-
ples.229 "[T]he executive veto, or the typically burdensome requirements
for amending state constitutions ... are not subject to equal protection
attack," 2 0 for example, because they restructure the political process so
as "to place obstacles in the path of everyone seeking to secure the bene-
fits of governmental action."'231 But this law, according to the Court, "ex-
pressly require[d] those championing school integration to surmount a
considerably higher hurdle than persons seeking comparable legislative
action. '' 2 2 Initiative 350 removed authority from the normal decision-
making body in one area only: that of racial integration. The Supreme
Court held that Hunter condemned such reallocations of power.233
Colorado's Amendment Two would have worked a similar realloca-
tion of power. Like Initiative 350, it would have removed one particular
issue from the normal political process. The Colorado legislature and
municipal governments could have debated any fair housing issues ex-
cept those involving the rights of lesbian, gay and bisexual people. "[O]n
those issues of importance to this identifiable group," the Evans plaintiffs
argued, "the representatives of gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals [would
225 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
226 Id. at 462.
227 Id. at 461-62.
228 Id. at 467.
229 Id. at 470.
230 Id.
231 Id.
232 Id. at 474.
233 Id.
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be] rendered incapable of granting relief. 2 34 Thus Washington and
Hunter appear to control Evans.
Some commentators seek to distinguish Washington from Evans on
racial grounds, however. According to the Evans defendants, for exam-
ple, Washington "reaffirmed race as the touchstone" of suspect class
analysis. 235 Justice Erickson, the sole dissenter in Evans, adheres to this
view. He described both Hunter and Washington as cases based on a
traditional suspect classification analysis, not on a fundamental rights
analysis. 236 But both the Evans and the Equality Foundation courts re-
jected this interpretation. Each court acknowledged that the existence of
racial discrimination "weighed heavily in the [Supreme] Court's consid-
eration"2 37 of Hunter and Washington, but asserted that "it would be er-
roneous to conclude that the 'neutral principle' precept is applicable only
in the context of racial discrimination. '2 38
Moreover, neither the Evans nor the Equality Foundation court
treated the initiatives at issue as mere repeals, even though they arguably
would have functioned only to revoke anti-discrimination legislation en-
acted at lower levels of government.239 Colorado and Ohio could, after
all, abolish local government entirely.240 Thus, the argument goes, states
should have plenary power to curtail the proper functions of those gov-
ernments.2 41 The Washington defendants, for example, argued that the
State of Seattle's ability to abolish school boards entirely implied that the
lesser power to create a rule of decision for school boards (in matters
involving mandatory bussing) must follow.242 But, according to the
Supreme Court, Initiative 350 did not simply repeal a law enacted at a
lower level of government: "Initiative 350 ... works something more
than the 'mere repeal' of a desegregation law by the political entity that
created it. It burdens all future attempts to integrate Washington schools
in districts throughout the State, by lodging decisionmaking authority
over the question at a new and remote level of government. 2 43 Amend-
234 Plaintiffs-Appellees' Answer Brief at 26, Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo.) (No.
93-SA-17), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 959 (1993).
235 Defendants-Appellees' Opening Brief at 13, Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo.
1994) (Nos. 94-SA-048 and 94-SA-128 (consolidated)), affd, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
236 Evans, 854 P.2d at 1297 (Erickson, I., dissenting).
237 Id. at 1281 (majority opinion).
238 Id. The Equality Foundation Court "[did] not agree that it necessarily follows that
Hunter, Washington or their progeny are 'race cases' and nothing more." Equality Found. of
Greater Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417, 432 (S.D. Ohio 1994), aff'd in part,
vacated in part, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995), vacated, 116 S. Ct. 2519 (1996) (remanding in
light of Romer, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996)).
239 See, e.g., Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 483-87 (1992).
240 Id. at 494 (Powell, J., dissenting).
241 Id. at 498.
242 Id. at 494-95.
243 Id. at 483 (majority opinion).
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ment Two and Issue Three would have done the same. In addition to
repealing existing anti-discrimination laws, they would have prevented
the passage of such laws in the future, thus disabling the state legislature
in any subsequent attempt to protect the lesbian, gay and bisexual citi-
zens of its state. Hence these initiatives would have gone further than just
"burdening" future attempts to enact such legislation. They would have
prevented them. According to the Washington majority, this state of af-
fairs would have offended the Constitution.
c. Gordon v. Lance244
In Gordon, the Supreme Court upheld a state law that had been
attacked on equal protection grounds. West Virginia citizens challenged
a statute requiring that any political subdivision seeking to incur bonded
indebtedness or to increase taxes beyond limits established by the state
constitution submit those issues to the voters for approval in a referen-
dum election. The statute required 60% voter approval in order that the
measure become law. After two such referendums failed, with the fiscal
proposals receiving 51.55% and 51.51% of the vote,245 citizens who fa-
vored the proposals sued for a declaratory judgment. They claimed that
the 60% requirement violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United
States Constitution. The rule, they argued, violated the principle of "one
person, one vote," by weighing the "no" votes more heavily than the
"yes" votes.246
In a seven-to-two decision, the Supreme Court upheld West Vir-
ginia's law, making it clear in the process that the principles articulated
in Hunter and in Washington do not extend only to matters of race. The
Court distinguished Gordon from Hunter by noting that the latter applied
to "fair housing legislation alone" whereas the former applied across the
board to all fiscal matters involving taxation or bonded indebtedness,
whatever their purpose.247 The sixty percent requirement reviewed in
Gordon did not, in other words, single out one particular issue for special
treatment. The Court could "discern no independently identifiable group
or category that favors bonded indebtedness over other forms of financ-
ing. Consequently no sector of the population may be said to be 'fenced
out' from the franchise because of the way they will vote."24 It allowed
the measure to stand, concluding that "so long as such provisions do not
244 403 U.S. 1 (1971).
245 Id. at 3.
246 See TRIBE, supra note 70, at 1096 n.3.
247 Gordon, 403 U.S. at 5.
248 Id. (citing Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965)).
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discriminate against or authorize discrimination against any identifiable
class they do not violate the Equal Protection Clause." 249
The Evans court thought it significant that the Supreme Court "felt
compelled to discuss Hunter" even though Gordon did not involve any
traditionally suspect classes.250 If Hunter had turned on the racially-dis-
criminatory nature of the Akron initiative, then the Court would have
distinguished it on those grounds. But it made no mention of race. "The
fact that the Court did not do so," in the words of the Evans majority,
"strongly suggests that the holding of Hunter cannot be limited in appli-
cation only to the review of legislation which discriminates on the basis
of race."'251 In Gordon, the Court discussed "independently identifiable"
classes, not "racial groups. '25 2 The class singled out for discriminatory
treatment in Colorado consisted of those people who would benefit from
laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation:
namely, the lesbian, gay and bisexual citizens of Colorado. 253 Thus, the
principles articulated in Hunter and Washington apply forcefully to the
fact pattern in Evans.
Some commentators, however, would still disagree. They view
Hunter and its progeny as cases involving traditionally suspect classes
despite the Gordon holding. The main support for this position comes
from James v. Valtierra,254 a case in which a majority of the Supreme
Court refused to extend Hunter to a provision that was not "aimed at a
racial minority. '255 In James, the Court examined an amendment to the
California Constitution adopted by initiative that provided that "no low-
rent housing project should be developed, constructed, or acquired ... by
a state public body until the project was approved by a majority of those
voting at a community election. '256 The James opinion, written by Jus-
tice Black,257 contains language that arguably contradicts the Court's
language in Gordon: "a lawmaking procedure that 'disadvantages' a par-
249 Id. at 7.
250 Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1282 (Colo.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 959 (1993).
251 Id.
252 Gordon, 403 U.S. at 5, 7.
253 Cf. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 390-91 (1969) (holding that a law requiring
approval by referendum of fair housing statutes aimed at eliminating discrimination based on
"race, color, religion, national origin or ancestry" burdens minorities).
254 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
255 James, 402 U.S. at 141. In distinguishing Hunter, the Court stated that that case had
dealt with a law that would have placed "special burdens on racial minorities within the gov-
ernmental process." Id. at 140 (citing Hunter, 393 U.S. at 391). It went on to say that "[tihe
present case could be affirmed only by extending Hunter, and this we decline to do." Id. at
141.
256 Id. at 139.
257 Justice Black dissented in Reitman, Washington and Hunter. He extolled the virtues of
the majority rule plebiscite processes that produced the laws challenged in those cases. See,
e.g., Hunter, 393 U.S. at 397.
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ticular group does not always deny equal protection. Under any such
holding, presumably a State would not be able to require referendums on
any subject unless referendums were required on all, because they would
always disadvantage some group. '258
The Evans and Equality Foundation courts did not, however, find
James useful as a general proposition. The Evans court explained that
James may be best understood "as a case declining to apply suspect class
status to the poor, and not as a limitation on Hunter."25 9 This analysis
seems sound for two reasons. First, all of the justices who joined in the
majority opinion in James also joined the Gordon opinion, in which they
applied Hunter to a law that did not involve a racial classification. 260
Thus race alone cannot constitute the distinguishing feature between
James and Gordon. Second, the Supreme Court has demonstrated ex-
treme reluctance, since the end of the Lochner era, to examine economic
issues with anything more than the most deferential review.261 In fact,
the dissenters in James disagreed with the majority on those very
grounds. They argued that a classification based on poverty merited sus-
pect class designation and strict scrutiny review.262 Professor Tribe
agrees with the Evans court that James is, more than anything else, an
aberration, relegated to that area of constitutional law reserved for classi-
fications based on wealth.263
Taken as a whole, then, Hunter, Washington and Gordon provided
the basis upon which the Evans and Equality Foundation courts invali-
dated Amendment Two and Issue Three. Notwithstanding the Supreme
Court's Romer decision, these cases arguably stand for the proposition
that state governments cannot exclude an identifiable group from equal
participation in the political process. Gordon makes clear that this prohi-
bition does not apply only to racial, ethnic, and religious groups. Accord-
ing to Justice Marshall, "[i]t is far too late in the day to contend that the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits only racial discrimination. .".. 264
d. Karcher v. Dagget
265
But how can a court isolate an independently identifiable group?
Hunter, Washington and Gordon provide little guidance. Karcher v.
Dagget, however, may provide some answers. In Karcher, the Court up-
258 James, 402 U.S. at 142.
259 Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1282 n.21 (Colo.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 959 (1993).
260 Id.
261 See generally, STONE, supra note 85, at 807-08 (discussing deferential review to eco-
nomic regulations since Lochner).
262 James, 402 U.S. at 144-45 (Marshall, J., writing for the dissent).
263 TRIE, supra note 70, at 1665-71.
264 James, 402 U.S. at 145 (Marshall, J., writing for the dissent).
265 462 U.S. 725 (1983).
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held a New Jersey reapportionment scheme and, in a concurring opinion,
Justice Stevens tackled some interesting equal protection problems.
He began by explaining that the Equal Protection Clause requires
states to govern their citizens impartially. Rules that "serve no purpose
other than to favor one segment-whether racial, ethnic, religious, eco-
nomic, or political-that may occupy a position of strength at a particu-
lar point in time, or . . . [rules that] disadvantage a politically weak
segment of the community . . . violate the constitutional guarantee of
equal protection. ' 266 He dismissed the notion that the Fourteenth
Amendment only protects racial minorities. Numerous Supreme Court
precedents, according to Justice Stevens, stand for the proposition that
the Equal Protection Clause prohibits laws that interfere with political
participation of "cognizable political as well as racial groups. ' 267 He
then offered a rudimentary definition of such groups: "Identifiable
groups will generally be based on political affiliation, race, ethnic group,
national origin, religion, or economic status, but other characteristics
may become politically significant in a particular context. '268 At another
point, Justice Stevens contends that identifiable groups become such
"only when their common interests are strong enough to be manifested in
political action ... -"269
Thus, when defendants in cases like Evans and Equality Foundation
bemoan the evils of extending constitutional protection to vaguely-de-
fined "identifiable groups," 270 courts should recognize their own ability
to fashion manageable standards, perhaps beginning with those sug-
gested by Justice Stevens in Karcher. In Washington, the Court easily
identified the group disadvantaged by Initiative 350 as "those who would
benefit from laws barring racial, religious, or ancestral discrimina-
tions."271 On the same reasoning, lesbian, gay and bisexual people com-
posed the group disadvantaged in Evans. State constitutional burdens
placed on those who desire the re-election of incumbent officials, on the
266 Id. at 748.
267 Id. at 749. He quotes Justice Douglas in Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 39 (1968),
saying that "the Equal Protection Clause protects 'voting rights and political groups ... as well
as economic units, racial communities, and other entities."' Id. Even Justices White and Pow-
ell, although they would have upheld the constitutionality of the reapportionment plan at issue,
agreed in their dissents with the proposition that "[ilt would . . . be a different matter
if . . [the] plan invidiously discriminated against a racial or political group." Id. at 783
(White, J., dissenting) (emphasis supplied). Powell, likewise, agreed with Stevens' observa-
tions. Id. at 787.
268 Id. at 754 n.12.
269 Id. at 750.
270 As the defendants pointed out in Evans, "there are an unlimited number of identifiable
groups which might be adversely affected by any distinction made by a law." Defendants-
Appellants' Opening Brief at 13, Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994) (Nos. 94-SA-
048 and 94-SA-128 (consolidated)), aff'd, 116 S. CL 1620 (1996).
271 Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391 (1969).
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other hand, do not single out a group identifiable independently of a pro-
vision limiting the terms of incumbents.272 Likewise, state prohibitions
on gambling do not single out people who are, as a group, identifiable
apart from that prohibition.
273
State limitations on abortion present a more difficult picture, how-
ever. The Colorado Constitution forbids state funding of abortions except
in certain limited categories.274 Advocates of state funding for any other
medical procedure could pass a law guaranteeing such funding by con-
vincing a majority of their state legislators to vote for the measure. But
advocates of state-funded abortions would have to amend the Colorado
Constitution before going to their legislature. 275 Does the group of wo-
men and men interested in state-funded abortions exist independently of
the abortion issue? Do they constitute a politically weak segment of the
society, or share the same political affiliations, or have other common
interests strong enough to translate into political action in other areas?
Their case is probably stronger than the case for those favoring legalized
gambling, but it still falls on the same side of the line. People who favor
publicly funded abortions do not necessarily come from a politically
weak segment of society; they do not share the same political affiliation;
and their other political interests, although in some instances similar, do
not automatically coincide.276 Lesbian, gay and bisexual people can be
identified as such regardless of their position on anti-discrimination laws.
As soon as a lesbian couple displays physical affection toward one an-
other in public, for example-or as soon as one of them places a framed
photograph of the other on her office desk-they are identified as queer.
In summary, Hunter, Washington and Davis enhance a long line of
precedent on topics such as voting rights, vote dilution, gerrymandering,
and candidate and voter qualifications. 277 According to the Evans and
Equality Foundation analyses rejected in Romer, these cases stand for
the proposition that citizens of the United States have a fundamental in-
terest in equal participation in the political process; excluding any inde-
272 In general, prohibitions on the re-election of incumbents disadvantage Republicans,
but in any given election and at any point in the history of this country, with its shifting
population patterns, that may or may not be the case. Cf. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109,
127, 143 (1985) (upholding a reapportionment plan that favored Republicans).
273 See COLO. CONsT. art. XVIII, § 9 (gaming allowed only in certain towns).
274 COLO. CONST. art. V, § 50.
275 Defendants-Appellants' Opening Brief at 13-14 & n.18, Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d
1335 (Colo. 1994) (Nos. 94-SA-048 and 94-SA-128 (consolidated)), aff'd, 116 S. Ct. 1620
(1996). The same problem is presented by the prospect of a state constitutional amendment
forbidding private discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Such an amendment could
arguably fence out the very group accused of excluding the lesbian, gay and bisexual commu-
nity: the religious right. Id. at 16.
276 See also text accompanying note 552 (discussing term limits, prohibitions on gam-
bling and limitations on abortion funding in the context of John Rawls' A Theory of Justice).
277 TRIBE, supra note 70 at §§ 13-1 through 13-31.
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pendently identifiable group from that process, such that it can never
achieve beneficial legislation, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution. As the Hunter Court observed, "[i]f a governmental institu-
tion is to be fair, one group cannot always be expected to win."2 78
Karcher refines this basic proposition, providing some guidance regard-
ing the definition of independently identifiable groups. The Colorado
Supreme Court's fundamental rights analysis in Evans was sound as a
matter of precedent, despite a contrary holding in the Sixth Circuit's
Equality Foundation (2), and the Romer Court correctly acknowledged
the importance of political participation even while declining to adopt the
Evans court's rationale.
3. Semi-Suspect Class Analysis
Regardless of its overall merit, the fundamental rights analysis in
Evans and Equality Foundation does expose and suffer from some of the
weaknesses inherent in equal protection doctrine. The concept of an
"identifiable" class seems unnervingly reminiscent of a "suspect" or
"semi-suspect" class. Perhaps the Evans and Equality Foundation courts,
in an attempt to protect the rights of lesbian, gay and bisexual people in a
post-Hardwick environment, inadvertently wove together two strands of
equal protection doctrine: suspect class and fundamental interests analy-
ses.279 Perhaps they entered the realm of suspect classification analysis
through the back door.
The Equality Foundation court entered that realm through the front
door as well. It accepted the fundamental rights analysis described in the
previous subsection, subjecting Issue Three to strict scrutiny and holding
that it violated the Equal Protection Clause,280 but it found, in addition,
that lesbiap, gay and bisexual people constitute a semi-suspect class.
28 1
Therefore, the court analyzed Issue Three with intermediate scrutiny,
striking down the initiative even under this lower standard of review.
2 82
The court examined four indicia of suspectness in coming to its de-
termination.283 First, it found that sexual orientation is an immutable
278 Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 394 (1969).
279 According to Professor Tribe, some intermediate scrutiny equal protection cases are
hybrids. They do not focus solely on the class singled out by the challenged law; they look, in
addition, to the right that law implicates. TRIE, supra note 70, at 1613 n.22. Evans (and
Equality Foundation) may actually utilize this type of analysis.
280 Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417, 433-34
(S.D. Ohio 1994), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995), vacated, 116 S.
Ct. 2519 (1996) (remanding in light of Romer, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996)).
281 Id. at 440.
282 Id. at 440, 444.
283 Id. at 436. The Equality Foundation court actually broke its analysis down into five
categories, but in combining two of them-immutability and whether or not an individual has
control over her sexual orientation-it essentially used only four criteria.
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characteristic. 284 According to the court, sexual orientation establishes
itself before the age of five years and develops outside of an individual's
control.285 Medical testimony cited by the court indicated that sexual ori-
entation "is unamenable to techniques designed to change it, and that
such techniques are considered unethical. ' 286 Furthermore, the court
found that "homosexual conduct" (or same-sex erotic activity) exists in-
dependently of "homosexual status" (or the fact of being a homosexual).
"[W]hile sexual conduct may be a matter of volition," the court stated,
"sexual orientation is not. '287
Second, the court found that lesbian, gay and bisexual people have
suffered a collective history of invidious discrimination. 288 Heterosexuals
have, for example, erroneously and harmfully stereotyped the queer com-
munity-suggesting a connection, for instance, between homosexuality
and pedophilia.289 In addition, medical professionals mistakenly charac-
terized homosexuality as a mental illness until relatively recently. 290
Moreover, lesbian, gay and bisexual people have experienced large-scale
private and public discrimination. 291
Third, the court found the queer community to be politically power-
less. According to the court, "undisputed evidence" indicated that les-
bian, gay and bisexual people face unique obstacles in the political
arena.292 For example, the queer community cannot effectively build co-
alitions with other political minorities because of its pervasive unpopu-
larity.2 93 This, in turn, hampers the ability of lesbian, gay and bisexual
people to pass legislation favorable to the queer community. For the
court, the widespread appearance of anti-gay initiatives themselves evi-
denced both the level of hostility directed toward lesbian, gay and bisex-
ual people and the political powerlessness of the group as a whole.294
"[W]hatever bona fide legislative victories gays, lesbians and bisexual[s]
may have achieved in recent years, those victories are being 'rolled back'
at an unprecedented rate and in an unprecedented manner. ' 295 The court
also noted the absence of openly gay officials from national decision-
making positions, likening it to the absence of women at the time of




288 Id. at 436.
289 Id. at 436-37.
290 Id. at 437.
291 Id.
292 Id. at 438.
293 Id.
294 Id. at 439.
295 Id.
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Frontiero v. Richardson,2 96 the case in which the Supreme Court desig-
nated gender a semi-suspect class.
297
Fourth, the court found that sexual orientation bears no relationship
to an individual's ability to perform, participate in or contribute to soci-
ety.2 98 The court cited the American Psychological Association for this
proposition.2 99 It also quoted military testimony claiming that "female
homosexual[s] in the Navy [are] . . . among the command's top
professionals."
300
In ruling that lesbian, gay and bisexual people constitute a semi-
suspect class, the Equality Foundation court acknowledged that its find-
ing contradicted those of "numerous Courts of Appeals .... -301 But it
distinguished its rationale from those of other courts, saying "We disa-
gree... with the fundamental underpinning of those decisions ... and
therefore decline to follow their reasoning. '302 The court found that ho-
mosexual status exists independently of homosexual conduct. A hetero-
sexual celibate, for example, retains her sexual attraction to men-her
sexual orientation-even though she abstains from sexual conduct.
30 3
According to the Equality Foundation court, "the fundamental underpin-
ning of those [Circuit Court] decisions ... [is] that homosexuality is a
status defined by conduct .... -304 Thus, even though many courts, be-
cause of the Supreme Court's Bowers v. Hardwick holding, 305 have de-
clined to accord suspect or semi-suspect status to classifications based on
sexual orientation, that precedent "does not preclude a finding that gays,
lesbians and bisexuals constitute a quasi-suspect class. 306
The court relied heavily on the last finding. Sexual orientation, it
said, not only exists outside an individual's control, it exists "indepen-
dently of any conduct that the individual ...may choose to engage
in."' 30 7 In other words, sexual, erotic behavior, or "conduct," is distinct
from sexual orientation, or "status." The court's jargon is no accident.
The bifurcation of status and conduct has, since Bowers v. Hardwick,
become the "driving force" in pro-gay litigation.308 When the Supreme
296 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
297 Equality, 860 F. Supp. at 439; see also Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686 n.17 (1973); TRIBE,
supra note 70, at 1562.
298 Equality, 860 F. Supp. at 437.
299 Id.
300 Id. (quoting Cammermeyer v. Aspin, 850 F. Supp. 910, 922 (W.D. Wash. 1994)).
301 Id. at 439.
302 Id.
303 See id. at 437.
304 Id. at 439.
305 Id.
306 Id. at 440. "Quasi-suspect" is synonymous with "semi-suspect." This Note uses the
latter terminology.
307 Id. at 437.
308 Cain, supra note 9, at 1617.
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Court held in 1986 that the Constitution does not protect consensual
adult homosexual sodomy as defined by the statute at issue in the case,309
it placed an official stamp of approval on criminal sodomy statutes
targeted at homosexuals. It thus set into motion a jurisprudence of sexual
orientation that has at its center the concept of sodomy. In 1987, for
example, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia called sod-
omy the "conduct that defines the class" of homosexuals, 310 and in 1988,
a member of the Ninth Circuit described sodomy as "fundamental to
[homosexuals'] ... very nature."
311
By holding as it did in Bowers, the Court spawned a new generation
of gay rights litigation that focuses on the distinction between homosex-
ual status and homosexual conduct in order to avoid the Hardwick hold-
ing. According to Professor Patricia Cain, the Hardwick decision "has
changed the course of gay rights litigation. '312 If litigators do not distin-
guish status from conduct, courts might refuse to examine laws that dis-
criminate against lesbian, gay and bisexual people with anything more
than a rational basis review on the reasoning that homosexuals as a class
are defined by conduct that states can constitutionally criminalize. But
according to Professor Cass Sunstein, "[t]he conclusion that the Due Pro-
cess Clause does not protect consensual homosexual sodomy does not
resolve the question whether principles of equal protection forbid dis-
crimination on the basis of sexual orientation." 313 He argues that:
The Due Process Clause is backward-looking; a large
part of its reach is defined by reference to tradition. The
clause is closely associated with, even if not limited to,
the view that the role of the Court is to protect against
ill-considered or short-term departures from time-
honored practices. The Equal Protection clause, by con-
trast, is grounded in a norm of equality that operates
largely as a critique of traditional practices. [There is]
reason to believe that constitutional protection against
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation will ul-
timately take place under the Equal Protection Clause. It
309 See supra § I(A) (3) (discussing the Hardwick case).
310 Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see also High Tech Gays v.
Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Off., 895 F.2d 563, 571 (9th Cir. 1990); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh,
881 F.2d 454, 464-65 (7th Cir. 1989); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed.
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1003 (1990).
311 Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1357 (9th Cir. 1988) (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting).
312 Cain, supra note 9, at 1617.
313 Sunstein, supra note 90, at 1178.
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should be unsurprising if such developments occur even
in the wake of Bowers v. Hardwick.314
4. Rational Basis Analysis
The Equality Foundation court also found that Issue Three failed a
rational basis review.315 A court must uphold a classification under this
standard if it can conceive of any reasonable set of facts upon which to
rationally base the classification. 316 In order to successfully defend an
anti-gay initiative, then, the government should have to offer no more
than a legitimate state interest and a reasonable 317 means/ends
relationship.
The Equality Foundation defendants offered six governmental pur-
poses to which Issue Three, they claimed, rationally related. These inter-
ests ranged from conserving fiscal resources318 and "promot[ing a]
diversity of views"'319 to "advanc[ing] democracy. '320 Nonetheless, the
court held that Issue Three offended the Equal Protection Clause. Thus
its rational basis review must have been more probing than most; it must
have had bite.321 The court itself said that "even the standard of rational-
ity.., must find some footing in the realities of the subject addressed by
the legislation. ' 322 It looked at both the propriety of the government's
purportedly legitimate interest in a classification based on sexual orienta-
tion and the means chosen to effectuate the desired result. Ultimately-in
language reminiscent of Cleburne and Moreno and seeming to invoke the
"improper purpose" rule 323-the court stressed the fact that the measure
bespoke "a bare desire to harm an unpopular group .... "324 The
Supreme Court has stated that such a desire can never constitute a legiti-
314 Id. at 1179.
315 Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417,
444 (1994), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995), vacated, 116 S.Ct. 2519
(1996) (remanding in light of Romer, 116 S.Ct. 1620 (1996)).
316 See supra § I(B) (2).
317 "Reasonable" and "rational" are used interchangeably in equal protection analysis.
318 Equality, 860 F. Supp. at 441.
319 Id. at 442.
320 Id. at 441.
321 See supra § I(B) (2).
322 Equality, 860 F. Supp. at 440 (quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321 (1993)).
323 See infra § I(A) (2).
324 Equality, 860 F. Supp. at 443 (citing United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno,
413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)). The improper purpose rule would probably fail if applied to a
"stealth" measure. See supra note 99 (defining such a measure). Such a measure would only
subtly admit of a "bare'. . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group." But anti-gay groups
would have a harder time passing such a law; it might prove difficult to generate public enthu-
siasm for measures like Amendment Two and Issue Three absent the vituperative and point-
edly homophobic propaganda which accompanied those initiatives.
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mate state interest. 325 "[M]ere negative attitudes, or fear" of a given
group do not rise to the level of legitimacy in governmental purposes. 326
Therefore, Issue Three, under this analysis, ran afoul of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause in that it promoted an illegitimate and irrational state interest.
The Supreme Court reasoned similarly in its Romer decision, invali-
dating Amendment Two via a rational basis review. Citing Moreno, the
Court observed that the law at issue "raise[d] the inevitable inference that
the disadvantage imposed [was] born of animosity toward the class of
persons affected. '327 Justice Kennedy spent a mere paragraph discussing
Colorado's proffered interests in Amendment Two. The state had argued
that the law would promote freedom of association (specifically, by al-
lowing landlords and employers to discriminate against lesbian, gay and
bisexual people for religious or other reasons), and that it would help
conserve fiscal resources better spent on fighting discrimination against
bona fide suspect classes. The majority rejected this argument, conclud-
ing that "t]he breadth of the Amendment is so far removed from these
particular justifications that we find it impossible to credit them. '328
5. The Evans Concurrence and a Suggested Alternative Holding
Justice Scott concurred with the Evans majority but wrote sepa-
rately to argue that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution would provide a more ap-
propriate basis upon which to decide the case.329 Section One of the
Fourteenth Amendment provides that "No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States. '330 According to Justice Scott, Amendment Two, if
enforced, would not only violate the Equal Protection Clause, but would
impermissibly burden the right of lesbian, gay and bisexual citizens to
peaceably assemble and to petition their government for redress of griev-
ances.331 Those rights, in Justice Scott's opinion, should find protection
under the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
His discussion of that Clause, although not entirely unique, is cer-
tainly unusual. In fact, it contradicts the Supreme Court's interpretation
of the Fourteenth Amendment. In 1873, only five years after the states
ratified the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court construed the Privileges or
325 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446-47 (1985); United States
Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
326 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448.
327 Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1628 (1996).
328 Id. at 1629.
329 Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1351 (Colo. 1994) (Scott, J., concurring), aff'd, 116
S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
330 U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 2.
331 Evans, 882 P.2d at 1351.
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Immunities Clause for the first time in the Slaughter-House Cases.332 It
held that the Clause applies only to those privileges or immunities estab-
lished by a state for its citizens and that it does not place certain rights
"under the special care of the Federal government .... -"333 Some privi-
leges or immunities, however, do, according to the Court, "ow[e] their
existence to the Federal government, its National character, its Constitu-
tion, or its laws. '334 Those privileges include "the right of free access
to... seaports; '335 the ability "to demand the care and protection of the
Federal government over... life, liberty, and property when on the high
seas; ' 336 and the "right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of
grievances .... 337
The Slaughter-House construction of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause has, in the words of Professor Tribe, rendered the Clause essen-
tially "superfluous." 338 As Justice Field pointed out in his dissent in that
case:
If [the Privileges or Immunities Clause] ... only refers,
as held by the majority ... to such privileges and immu-
nities as were before its adoption specially designated in
the Constitution or necessarily implied as belonging to
citizens of the United States, it was a vain and idle enact-
ment, which accomplished nothing, and most unnecessa-
rily excited Congress and the people on its passage. With
privileges and immunities thus designated ... no new
constitutional provision was required .... 339
The Slaughter-House majority claimed that a construction of the Clause
in which the Court incorporated either natural rights or the rights enu-
merated in the Bill of Rights would "radically [change] the whole theory
of the relations of the State and Federal governments to each other and of
both these governments to the people. '3 40 But, according to many com-
mentators, this "quite arguably was precisely what the authors of the
Amendment had in mind."'341 The legislative history of the Fourteenth
Amendment, in fact, does not necessarily mandate the Slaughter-House
interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. It may even contra-
332 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
333 Id. at 78-79.




338 STONE, supra note 85, at 777.
339 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 96 (Field, J., dissenting).
340 Id. at 78.
341 See, e.g., David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: Limitations on
State Power, 1865-1873, 51 U. Cm. L. REv. 329, 348 (1984).
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dict the Court's construction. According to Justice Scott, for example,
"the original understanding [of the Privileges or Immunities Clause] was
virtually written out of the Constitution by the United States Supreme
Court in the Slaughter-House Cases. '342 Several commentators agree,
and, like Justice Scott, would applaud a revival of the Privileges or Im-
munities Clause. 343 They support their arguments for revival with a his-
torical analysis of the drafting and adoption of the Civil War
Amendments.
In the words of Justice Scott, "[a] review of the legislative his-
tory... will not permit such an ambivalent view '"344 of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause as that contained in the Slaughter-House decision.
Many scholars believe that "[t]he Civil War . . .and the Civil War
amendments fundamentally realigned federal-state relations. '345 In 1865,
at the close of the Civil War, the states ratified the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, thus prohibiting slavery and involuntary servitude and ending an
era in which the judiciary could legitimately defend the enslavement of
millions of people of African descent.346 But the Thirteenth Amendment
proved insufficient to protect African Americans from continued vio-
lence and discrimination at the hands of both private and state actors.
Thus Congress drafted, and the states-some of them reluctantly-rati-
fied the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States Con-
stitution. The former Amendment provides that "[a]ll persons born or
naturalized in the United States . . .are citizens . . . . "347 Congress
designed it specifically to overrule the Dred Scott348 decision of 1856, in
which the Supreme Court held that African Americans "were not in-
tended to be included, under the word 'citizens' in the Constitution, and
can therefore claim none of the rights and privileges which that instru-
ment provides for and secures to citizens of the United States."349 Schol-
arly consensus suggests that Congress had another purpose in mind in
drafting the Fourteenth Amendment. It intended that Section One350
342 Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1352 (Colo. 1994) (Scott, J., concurring), aff'd, 116
S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
343 See e.g., STONE, supra note 85, at 774-777 (discussing the demise of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause); John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101
YALE LJ. 1385, 1387-89 (1992).
344 Evans, 882 P.2d at 1353.
345 STONE, supra note 85, at 779.
346 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIII.
347 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
348 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
349 Id. at 404.
350 "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
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would insure the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.3 51 The
Reconstruction Congress had passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866 after
passage of the Thirteenth Amendment. 352 It declared that all persons
born in the United States were citizens and assured the equal application
of certain common law rights, such as the ability to enforce contracts and
to own property.353 Opponents of civil rights attacked the Act as uncon-
stitutional. According to Professor Eisenberg, "doubts as to the adequacy
of the Thirteenth Amendment and the 1866 act became so acute that it
was soon deemed advisable to recast the provisions in a more detailed
mold of a new constitutional amendment. Such was the motivating factor
that led to the birth of the Fourteenth Amendment.1354 Thus, Congress
drafted and the states ratified the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
and the Civil Rights Act of 1870 was enacted into law.
It is with reference to this context-the aftermath of a civil war and
a Reconstruction Congress that forever changed the balance of power
between federal and state government-that the legislative intent behind
the Privileges or Immunities Clause must be determined. According to
Justice Scott, the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment thought the
Clause "very important '355 and designed it to "impose[ ] substantive lim-
its upon the states. '356 He quotes from Corfield v. CoryeIl3 57 phrases in
which Justice Washington evidences a natural rights jurisprudence in his
interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. According to Jus-
tice Washington, the Clause was meant to protect those privileges
"which belong ... to the citizens of all free governments. '358 He addi-
tionally describes the Clause as protecting rights relating to life, liberty,
property, happiness and safety.359 Corfield, according to Justice Scott,
became the "pole star" for the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment.
360
Senator Howard, in presenting the Amendment to the Senate for adop-
tion, used the Corfield interpretation of "privileges or immunities" and
included also the rights to assemble and to petition the government for
redress of grievances, as well as the guarantees in the first eight amend-
ments to the Constitution. In his words,
351 Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1352 n.2 (Colo. 1994), aff'd, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996);
STONE, supra note 85, at 776.
352 EISENBERG, supra note 128, at 3.
353 Id. at 3.
354 Id. at 21.
355 Evans, 882 P.2d at 1353 (Scott, J., concurring) (quoting from the Congressional
Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., part 3, p. 2765 (1866)).
356 Id.
357 6 F. Cas. 546 (E.D. Pa. 1825) (No. 3230).
358 Evans, 882 P.2d at 1353 (citing Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551).
359 Id. (quoting Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551-52).
360 Id. at 1353-54.
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To [the]... privileges and immunities [enumerated in
Corfield], whatever they may be-for they are not and
cannot be fully defined in their entire extent and precise
nature-to these should be added the personal rights
guarantied [sic] and secured by the first eight amend-
ments of the Constitution; such as the freedom of speech
and of the press; the right of the people peaceably to
assemble and petition the Government for a redress of
grievances, a right appertaining to each and all the peo-
ple ....
* * .The great objective of the first section of this
amendment is, therefore, to restrain the power of the
States and compel them at all times to respect these great
fundamental guarantees.
361
This history indicates that the framers of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments intended that Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment
be something more than a "dead letter."
According to Justice Scott, "an unfortunate history and a refusal to
rely upon the plain text of the [C]onstitution ... has resulted in a Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause that has been eclipsed by the Equal Protec-
tion and Due Process Clauses. '362 With the Privileges or Immunities
Clause gutted, courts began to incorporate the substantive guarantees in-
cluded in the Bill of Rights through the Due Process and Equal Protec-
tion Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Most of those guarantees
have been incorporated. 363 The demise of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause, then, opened the door for the problematic area of constitutional
jurisprudence known as "substantive due process. '364 Justice Scott be-
moans the fact that courts have abandoned the Privileges or Immunities
Clause since the Slaughter-House Cases, and "unfortunately, have in-
stead built upon the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause. ' 365
This legacy is responsible for the claimants' reliance on the Equal Pro-
tection Clause in Evans and explains Justice Scott's belief that their argu-
ment (in a world in which the Privileges or Immunities Clause 'had
substance) would not form the most appropriate basis from which to ar-
gue for gay rights.
According to Justice Scott, Amendment Two, if enacted, would
have denied the right of lesbian, gay and bisexual people to petition their
government for redress of grievances, to peaceably assemble, and to par-
361 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., part 3, pp. 2765-66 (1866).
362 Evans, 882 P.2d at 1352.
363 STONE, supra note 85, at 777-78.
364 See id. at 759-1010.
365 Evans, 882 P.2d at 1355.
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ticipate in the political process. 366 "[T]he right peaceably to assemble
and petition is meaningless," in the words of Justice Scott, "if by law
government is powerless to act."367 He explains further that "[i]t should
be axiomatic that the right peaceably to assemble and petition govern-
ment implies the ability of the duly elected representatives to respond, if
so persuaded or predisposed." 368 Yet, he argued, Amendment Two, if
enacted, would have prevented the Colorado General Assembly, or any
municipal legislative body, from adopting laws favorable to homosexu-
als.369 It would have "effectively denie[d] the right to petition or partici-
pate in the political process by voiding, ab initio, redress from
discrimination." 370 In other words, if Amendment Two had become law,
Justice Scott argues, lesbian, gay and bisexual people could have lobbied
for the passage of gay-protective laws, but their legislators, however
sympathetic, would have been powerless to respond.371
Instead of arguing against this abridgement of their rights via the
Equal Protection Clause, and encountering the hurdles presented by a
three-tier process of review, the lowest of which almost inevitably results
in a finding of constitutionality, the Justice suggested that the Privileges
or Immunities Clause would have better protected gay rights.372 "The
importance of the Privileges or Immunities Clause is that it does not re-
quire varying standards of review and that its protections are extended to
every citizen." 373 With a viable Privileges or Immunities Clause, lesbian,
gay and bisexual people would have escaped the difficult argument that
they comprise a class "worthy" of suspect or semi-suspect class designa-
tion. They would have escaped the argument that the Supreme Court has
implicitly recognized a fundamental interest in Hunter and its progeny-
so difficult to win in the face of a Court that is reluctant to increase the
number of rights deemed fundamental. 374 They would have been able to
level a simple and straightforward argument based on the Bill of Rights'
protection of the right to peaceably assemble and to petition government
for redress of grievances through the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
II. THE MORAL CONTEXT
The Equal Protection Clause guarantees that government will not
create laws which irrationally classify citizens as eligible or ineligible for
366 Id. at 1356.




371 See supra § I(A) (3).
372 Evans, 882 P.2d at 1355-56.
373 Id. at 1356.
374 Cain, supra note 9, at 1171.
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the benefits and burdens of public life. Government legislation must fur-
ther legitimate state interests and the means chosen to further those inter-
ests must reasonably relate to the desired ends. In addition, government
cannot interfere with the exercise of, or access to, a fundamental right,
unless it has a compelling interest in doing so. Thus, when a law targets a
class of persons for different treatment, that class can challenge the law
under the Equal Protection Clause. If the government has singled the
challengers out from similarly situated individuals, the court must strike
it down. But suppose a class singled out for different treatment by gov-
ernment legislation mounts an equal protection challenge and loses. Sup-
pose further that the members of that group believe that the court has
wrongly decided their case.3 75 Do they have an obligation to obey a law
that they consider-perhaps correctly-to be unjust?
Philosophers have wrestled with that question for at least two thou-
sand years and, with certain qualifications, have answered it in the af-
firmative. This Section, in order to provide a moral framework in which
to discuss Romer v. Evans,376 begins by describing six theories by which
scholars have sought to ground an obligation to obey the law. 377
A. Six THEORIES OF POLITICAL OBLIGATION
Any thorough examination of political obligation 378 should include
a discussion of Plato's Crito,379 written around 400 B.C. It presents a
dialogue that takes place between Socrates and his friend Crito in the
prison in which the former awaits his execution after a court has sen-
375 E.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that states can constitution-
ally criminalize oral and anal sexual relations between consenting adults of the same sex).
376 See infra § II(B).
377 For a moral account of homosexuality and the law antithetical to that presented here,
see John M. Finnis, Law, Morality, and "Sexual Orientation," 69 NOTRE DAmE L. REv. 1049
(1994) (arguing that "[a] political community... can rightly judge that it has a compelling
interest in denying that homosexual conduct.., is a valid, humanly acceptable choice.., and
... can... discourage such conduct."). Id. at 1070. Finnis believes that the Supreme Court
overlooked "a sound and important distinction of principle" in extending the right to use con-
traceptives to unmarried heterosexual couples. Id. at 1076. The only morally good sexual ac-
tivity, according to Finnis, is that which occurs between a married heterosexual couple not
using contraceptives. Martha C. Nussbaum, Platonic Love and Colorado Law: The Relevance
of Ancient Greek Norms to Modem Sexual Controversies, 80 VA. L. REv. 1515, 1525 & n.30
(1994) (quoting Finnis).
378 Anglo-American theorists often discuss the duty to obey the law in the context of
something they term "political obligation." CHAIM GANS, PHM.OsOPHICAL ANARCHISM AND
PoLrmcAL DIsOsEOmNCE 8 (1992). To the degree that political obligation involves activities
characteristic of good citizenship in general, however, the concept may encompass more than
just obedience to law. Id. at 8-9. Nevertheless, because the duty to obey the law composes the
"hard core" of political obligation, the terms are used synonymously in this Note. Id. at 9.
379 THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO (B. Jowett trans., 1937) [hereinafter PLATO].
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tenced him to death for corrupting the minds of Athenian youth.380 Crito
tries to persuade Socrates to escape, but Socrates refuses, arguing that
such disregard for law would undermine the principles for which his life
has stood.381 He explains his rationale by personifying the laws, by imag-
ining what they would say to him upon escape:
[H]e who disobeys us is ... thrice wrong; first, because
in disobeying us he is disobeying his parents; secondly,
because we are the authors of his education; thirdly, be-
cause he has made an agreement with us that he will
duly obey our commands; and he neither obeys them nor
convinces us that our commands are unjust.3
82
One can discern in this excerpt from Crito the kernels of both the "grati-
tude" and the "consent" theory of political obligation.383 At other points
in the dialogue, one can discern the "negative consequences" theory of
political obligation, the proponents of which claim that obedience to law
springs from the danger posed to the political system by disobedience.
384
When the laws of Athens interrogate Socrates for his hypothetical escape
from prison, for example, they ask:
[A]re you not going by an act of yours to overturn us-
the laws, and the whole state, as far as in you lies? Do
you imagine that a state can subsist and not be over-
thrown, in which the decisions of law have no power,
but are set aside and trampled upon by individuals? 385
In other words, according to Socrates speaking for the laws of Athens,
disobedience to law threatens a "well-ordered" 386 society, and that threat
gives rise to political obligation in the form of obedience to law.
Crito provides an appropriate launchpad, then, for a discussion of
fidelity to law. This subsection introduces six theories of political obliga-
tion-that is, six arguments by which philosophers have attempted to
ground an obligation to obey the law. 387 It begins with the arguments
from gratitude, from consent, and from negative consequences-
presented in Crito-and continues with the relatively new arguments
from fairness and from the duty to support just institutions, presented for
380 "Socrates is a doer of evil, who corrupts the youth; and who does not believe in the
gods of the state, but has other new divinities of his own." Id. at 407.
381 Id. at 430-38. In response to Crito's suggestion that he escape, Socrates replies: "the
principles which I have hitherto honoured and revered I still honour, and unless we can at once
find other and better principles, I am certain not to agree with you . I... d. at 430.
382 Id. at 435-36.
383 GANS, supra note 378, at 42 n.1; see also infra § II(A) (1)-(2).
384 GANS, supra note 378, at 42 n.1.
385 PLATO, supra note 379, at 434.
386 Id. at 437.
387 For a list of these theories, see GANS, supra note 378, at 42-43.
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the most part by H. L. A. Hart and John Rawls. 388 It closes with the more
recent argument from communal obligations, posited by Ronald
Dworkin.38 9
1. The Argument from Gratitude
Proponents of the argument from gratitude contend that those who
benefit from the existence of a legal system owe a debt of gratitude to
that system, and that this debt of gratitude gives rise to an obligation to
obey the law.390 In Crito, for example, the laws compare themselves to
Socrates' parents. 391 They ask him if he can deny that he is their "child
and [their] slave,"392 given the fact that they "brought [him] into the
world, and nurtured and educated [him], and [gave him] ... a share in
every good which [they] had to give ... -393 They admonish him for his
hypothetical escape from prison, asking him whether he would pretend to
"have any right to strike or revile or [to] do any other evil to [his] father
or [his] master... because [he had] . . . been struck or reviled by him, or
received some other evil at his hands?" 394 The laws of a given state re-
quire obedience from the populace, according to Crito, because the laws
provide lifelong benefits to the citizenry.
Critics of the argument from gratitude point to three fatal flaws in
the theory.395 First, they contend that the recipient of a benefit must ac-
cept the goods intentionally, of her own free will, in order to engender a
sense of gratitude.396 An individual who receives goods involuntarily
owes no debt of gratitude to her benefactor.397 If a woman returns from
work in the evening to find a freshly-painted house without having re-
quested it, for instance, she may or may not experience a feeling of grati-
tude toward the painter. If she did not want her house painted or if she
detests its new color, she may not feel grateful. She will not, in other
388 Id. at 43 n.2. H. L. A. Hart introduced the argument from fairness during the 1950s;
Rawls expanded the concept. Rawls' A Theory of Justice may have been the genesis for the
argument from the duty to support just institutions. Id.
389 RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 195-216 (1986) [hereinafter EMPIRE].
390 See generally A. Jom SIMMONS, MORAL PmNCIPLES AND PoLITcAL OBuGATIONS
163-183 (1979) (discussing debts of gratitude).
391 In addition, they compare themselves to Socrates' educators, asking "Were not the
laws, which have the charge of education, right in commanding your father to train you in
music and gymnastic?" PLATO, supra note 379, at 434. Characterizing the laws as educators
would also give rise to a debt of obligation.
392 Id. at 435.
393 Id.
394 Id.
395 In referring to the argument from gratitude and the argument from consent, Professor
Gans writes "[t]he criticism aimed at the first two arguments is, in my opinion, fatal." GANS,
supra note 378, at 43.
396 Id. at 46.
397 Id.
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words, automatically approve of the choices made by her benefactor, and
a debt of gratitude may or may not arise. Likewise, in a system of law,
some citizens may object to the quality or distribution of legal benefits
and burdens; and they may not approve of the concomitant obligation to
obey the law. 398 Some of the legal goods granted citizens "are in fact
forced upon them." 399 Thus, all citizens may not owe a debt of gratitude
to the state.400 Second, obedience to law does not necessarily represent
the only appropriate way in which one can express gratitude to law.
40 1
The fact that a mother raises and educates her son, for example, giving
rise to a debt of gratitude on the son's part, does not mean that he must
obey his mother's every command, no matter how outrageous. 40 2 He,
like the subject of law, has many avenues through which he can demon-
strate his gratitude, and certain commands may not bind the child be-
cause, by their very nature, they conflict with some other duty or
obligation.40 3 Third, and perhaps most importantly, critics of the argu-
ment from gratitude contend that an "altruistic motivation on the part of
the benefactor is a necessary condition for his or her right to the benefici-
ary's gratitude." 4°4 This criticism undermines the argument's very appli-
cability to the relations between the law and its subjects, for how can one
ascribe altruistic motives to laws? "It is rather difficult," according to
Professor Chaim Gans, "not because there is any evidence to the con-
trary, but because it is difficult to ascribe [to] them any intentions at
all."405 In summary, the argument from gratitude fails because (1) a ben-
398 Id. ("Not all of the law's subjects have good reason to prefer the situation combining
the advantages and disadvantages of obedience and of the law's existence, to one where
neither exist.").
399 Id.
400 This objection "casts doubt upon the universality of this obligation's applicability." Id.
401 Id. at 46-47 (citing M.B.E. Smith, Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the
Law?, 82 YALE LJ. 950, 953-54 (1973)).
402 "A fifty-year-old son may have numerous duties toward his eighty-year-old parents,
but they will all be duties to help them, not to obey them. No matter how grateful he is to them
for their past services, he can have no duty to let them determine, for example, what hour he
must come home at night or what foods he may eat." Joel Feinberg, Civil Disobedience in the
Modem World, HUMAN. IN SOC'Y, Winter 1979, at 37, 49.
403 David Lyons, Lectures in Resistance and Responsibility at Cornell Law School (Fall
1994).
404 G~as, supra note 378, at 44.
405 Id. at 45. In Crito, Socrates personifies the laws, thus giving them the characteristics
of a parent and teacher who can in fact operate from altruistic motives. See supra text accom-
panying note 391-94. Thomas Hobbes, and later John Austin and Jeremy Bentham, describe
the benefactor of the subjects' gratitude as a sovereign: an individual or group in which valid
laws originate. Instead of personifying the laws themselves, these writers argued that "in any
society where there is law, there actually is a sovereign, characterized affirmatively and nega-
tively by reference to the habit of obedience: a person or body of persons whose orders the
great majority of the society habitually obey and who does not habitually obey any other
person or persons." H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPr OF LAW 49 (Tony Honore et al. eds., 10th
ed. 1993) [hereinafter HART, TCL]. Under this theory, then, one could ascribe altruistic mo-
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eficiary must voluntarily accept goods in order to owe a debt of grati-
tude; (2) obedience to law may or may not represent the only way in
which citizens can express their gratitude to law; and (3) a benefactor
must operate from altruistic motives in order to deserve her beneficiary's
gratitude.
2. The Argument from Consent
A second argument by which philosophers have attempted to
ground an obligation to obey the law is the argument from consent. His-
torically, consent theory has captured the popular imagination perhaps
more than any other theory of political obligation.406 According to John
Simmons, the argument from consent "has provided us with a more intui-
tively appealing account of political obligation than any other tradition in
modem political theory." 407 In fact, contemporary political debates in the
United States regularly appeal to the consent theory of governance.
Think, for example, of the Republicans' "Contract with American"
rhetoric. 40
8
Scholars have produced two important models of political obliga-
tion based on consent.40 9 According to the first model, a citizen must
expressly act in order to indicate a commitment to abide by the laws of
tives to the lawmaker(s). Most scholars, however, have discarded the Austinian vision of legal
systems insofar as it positions the source of law in something approximating a flesh-and-blood
human being. See generally, e.g., Id. (analyzing Austin's theory of law). Even if Austinian
theory were defensible, the motives of the sovereign, according to Hobbes, are "like those of
all human agents.... egotistical." GANs, supra note 378, at 45 (quoting Hobbes). Thus, such a
sovereign would lack the altruism necessary to generate a debt of gratitude. A third group of
theorists locate the source of laws in human beings-those people who create and execute the
law. Under this view, citizens could owe a debt of gratitude to their legislators and other public
officials. A fourth theory, adopted by H. L. A. Hart, contends that neither a personal sovereign
nor a group of legislative and executive officials constitute the source of law. He argues in-
stead that all the individual citizens who agree to obey the law in order that they and their
community may benefit from the law's existence constitute the source of law. Under Hart's
view, one may ascribe altruistic motives to the benefactor. This discussion about the laws as
benefactor is taken from GANs, supra note 378, at 44-45.
406 GANs, supra note 378, at 49.
407 A. John Simmons, Tacit Consent and Political Obligation, 5 J. PmnL. & Pus. AFF. 274,
274 (1976).
408 The Republicans' "Contract with America," for example, seems to equate the act of
voting with acquiescing to a very specific political dgenda; voting for a republican, in other
words, even out of frustration with incumbents rather than out of an affirmative desire for a
particular candidate, translates into, among other things, depriving unwed mothers of their
welfare benefits. Marshall Ingwerson, In Era of GOP, Is There Any Left Left?, CHRIMAN SCI.
MoNrrOR, Dec. 5, 1994, at 1 (discussing the Republican program); Adam Clymer, GOP Cele-
brates its Sweep to Power, N.Y. TimEs, Nov. 10, 1994, at Al (discussing voters' motives).
409 At least four models of consent theory exist: (1) consent based on explicit agreement
to the terms of a legal obligation; (2) consent based on tacit agreement; (3) consent based on
hypothetical agreement; and (4) historical consent, i.e., "that of the first generation of subjects
to a given system of laws." GANs, supra note 378, at 50.
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her state. Express consent of this sort would "firmly and decisively" 410
establish an obligation to obey the law.411 But because few citizens ex-
plicitly consent to obey the laws of their community, 412 theorists have
broadened the concept of actual consent such that consent can be implied
from certain conduct.413 This "tacit consent" forms the core of the sec-
ond model of consent theory. Under this view, continued residence in a
given locality or voting for the legislators of a given community-or
even, in some cases, silence--can constitute the necessary act.414 One
infers actual consent to the laws of the community from conduct of this
kind.
In Crito, when the laws chastise Socrates for "breaking the cove-
nants and agreements which [he] made with" them,415 they assume quite
plainly that his obligation to obey them is grounded on consent. Specifi-
cally, they base their argument from consent on Socrates' continued resi-
dence 416 in Athens:
[W]e ... proclaim to any Athenian by the liberty which
we allow him, that if he does not like us when he has
become of age and has seen the ways of the city, and
made our acquaintance, he may go where he pleases and
take his goods with him. None of us laws will forbid him
or interfere with him. .. . But he who has experience of
the manner in which we order justice and administer the
state, and still remains, has entered into an implied con-
tract that he will do as we command him. 4
17
John Locke and Jean Jacques Rousseau also treat continued residence in
a given locality as evidence of consent to its laws. 418 In The Second
410 See id. at 49.
411 See also Simmons, supra note 407, at 290 ("[C]onsent, be it tacit or express, may still
be the firmest ground of political obligation (in that people who have consented probably have
fewer doubts about their obligations than others) ....").
412 Two groups who do so in the United States are naturalized immigrants and state offi-
cials. GANS, supra note 378, at 49 n.14.
413 Even the proponents of consent theory, at least in modem times, have abandoned the
idea that citizens expressly consent to be bound by the laws of their community. According to
Simmons, "[s]ince the earliest consent theories, it has been recognized that 'express consent' is
not a suitably general ground for political obligation." Simmons, supra note 407, at 278.
414 GANS, supra note 378, at 49; Simmons, supra note 407, at 279.
415 PLATO, supra note 379, at 436.
416 "You, Socrates, are breaking the covenants and agreements which you made with us at
your leisure ... after you have had seventy years to think of them ...." Id.
417 Id. at 435.
418 John Locke is considered the main proponent of the tacit consent model of political
obligation. GANS, supra note 378, at 49 n.15. According to Rousseau, "[w]hen the State is
instituted, residence constitutes consent; to dwell within its territory is to submit to the Sover-
eign." JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, Tim SOCIAL CoNTRAcr AND THE DISCOURSES 105-06
(G.D.H. Cole trans., E.P. Dutton and Company, Inc., 1950) (1762).
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Treatise of Civil Government, Locke states that "every man, that hath
any possession, or enjoyment, of any part of the dominions of any gov-
ernment, doth thereby give his tacit consent, and is far forth obliged to
obedience to the laws of that government." 419 For Locke, it seems, tacit
consent is "quite independent of the consenter's intentions or awareness
that he is consenting;" 420 a binding obligation to obey the laws can arise
without the obligor's knowledge.
John Simmons characterizes this assertion as "a patent absurd-
ity."421 He agrees with Locke that an obligation to obey the law can arise
from the enjoyment of the benefits of civil society, 42 but he criticizes
Locke's inference of a genuine consensual act from that enjoyment.
423
The obligation arises instead, he claims, from "considerations of fairness
or gratitude." 424 He disagrees with Locke's grounding of such an obliga-
tion on consent instead of on the principle of fair play, on the principle of
gratitude, "or under some other kind of principle of repayment." 425
Critics of the argument from consent, then, contend that the theory
mistakenly ascribes consent to citizens who have unknowingly "agreed"
to obey the laws of their community.4 26 In particular, they argue that
inferring consent from continued residence suffers from two weak-
nesses.427 First, empirical evidence indicates that long-term residents of a
given locality do not regard their inhabitancy as indicating consent to
law.428 Consent requires a conscious and intentional mental act. 429 Ac-
cording to John Simmons, "tacit consent must meet the same fate as ex-
press consent concerning its suitability as a general ground of political
obligation. . . . [I]t seems clear that very few of us have ever tacitly
consented to the government's authority in the sense" Locke
described. 430
419 Simmons, supra note 407, at 281-82.
420 Id. at 281.
421 Id. at 282.
422 Id. at 288. He describes these items as "the benefits of the rule of law, police protec-
tion, protection by the armed forces, and so on:' Id.
423 "My suggestion is that none of Locke's 'consent-implying enjoyments' is in fact a
genuine consensual act." Id.
424 Id.
425 Id. at 291.
426 These citizens may not only unknowingly "agree" to obey the law; they may affirma-
tively object to such obedience. See infra notes 459-61 and accompanying text.
427 For an argument against inferring consent from voting or political participation, see id.
at 289.
428 GANs, supra note 378, at 52.
429 Id. Unintentional consent is generally not binding. Id. at 52-53 (discussing one case in
which unintentional consent is binding) (citing Harry Beran, In Defense of the Consent Theory
of Political Obligation and Authority, 87 ETmcs 260-70 (1976-77)).
430 Simmons, supra note 407, at 290. Most citizens are neither aware of the possibility
nor intend that their continued residence in a locality should indicate consent. Perhaps Austin
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Second, critics argue, even if continued residence reliably indicated
consent, that consent would not bind the resident because his tacit agree-
ment to obey the laws of his locality occurs in the presence of duress or
undue influence.431 Many scholars do not view the choice given in Crito,
between continued residence in one's home, combined with potentially
unwilling obedience, on the one hand, and emigration,432 on the other, as
a free choice. David Hume, for example, described such a choice as
follows:
Can we seriously say that a poor peasant or artisan has a
free choice to leave his country, when he knows no for-
eign language or manners, and lives from day to day by
the small wages which he acquires? We may as well as-
sert that a man remaining in a vessel, freely consents to
the dominion of the master, though he was carried on
board while asleep, and must leap into the ocean and
perish the moment he leaves her.
433
According to John Simmons, when a citizen must choose between emi-
gration and obedience, her "fundamental and necessary needs are being
exploited." 434Any consent she gives occurs in an atmosphere of duress
and undue influence and is therefore invalid. Professor Gans argues fur-
thermore that the entire emigration/obedience dichotomy begs the ques-
tion. He asks "whether anyone, including the state, has a right to force us
to choose either emigrating or staying and obeying. '435 One can only
attribute such a right to the state if one accepts a prima facie obligation
on the part of the citizenry to obey its commands. 436 Most scholars con-
was correct in describing the attitude of most citizens as that of "habitual obedience" to law.
HART, TCL, supra note 405, at 50-60.
431 GANS, supra note 378, 53-57.
432 See supra note 417 and accompanying text.
433 GANS, supra note 378, at 53 (quoting David Hume). Some people do not accept this
criticism as fatal, claiming that the choice between emigration and continued residency com-
bined with political obligation is, perhaps, a difficult choice, but is not a choice made under
duress. Id. at 54 (describing the stance taken by Harry Beran). Still others, while accepting
Hume's criticism, believe that such a choice does not result in a binding commitment one way
or the other. John Simmons, for example, does not characterize the choice between emigration
and continued residence as duress, but does consider the choice to be one which is made under
"undue influence." Id. (citing A. John Simmons, Consent, Free Choice and Democratic Gov-
ernment, 18 GA. L. REv. 791, 811-13 (1984)).
434 Id.
435 Id. at 55.
436 Id. at 54-57. As for Hume's example, he would modify it such that it would focus
more on the objectionable choice faced by the man on the boat, rather than on the "insufferable
difficulty of jumping into the oceans .... Id. at 55. The question Professor Gans would ask is
whether or not the ship's owner-who now demands the man's obedience or departure-
brought the man aboard in the first place, thus creating the situation in which he had to choose
between the two. The man's consent in this case is clearly not binding, according to Gans,
because it was given both under undue influence and under duress. Id. at 55-57.
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sider these criticisms to have fatally undermined the argument from con-
sent. According to John Simmons, the obligations generated from the
enjoyment of civil society do not "fall under principles of fidelity or con-
sent." Consent theory, in his words, "surely fails to give a suitably gen-
eral account of our political obligations . . .437
3. The Argument from Negative Consequences
Proponents of the argument from negative consequences contend
that an obligation to obey the law follows directly from the social danger
inherent in disobedience to law. In Crito, the laws ask Socrates whether
he thinks a state can endure when its legal decisions have no binding
force.438 They urge him to submit to the sentence of death, even though
he considers this sentence unjust, because negative consequences, ac-
cording to the laws, will result from legal infidelity. So goes the argu-
ment from negative consequences: "[d]isobedience may encourage
additional cases of disobedience, thus causing the deterioration of [the
law's] operation as a tool for determining and enforcing desirable
conduct."439
Theorists have presented two criticisms of this argument. First, they
point out that undesirable consequences do not flow from every act of
disobedience.44° Thus the argument from negative consequences is insuf-
ficient to justify a general obligation to obey the law. At most, it can
ground an obligation to obey a select group of laws.44 ' Second, they
argue that grounding an obligation to obey the law in the negative conse-
quences that flow from disobedience would serve only to assure compli-
ance with "bad" laws.442 Citizens will obey "good" laws because they
are good, not because of the damage disobedience causes the legal sys-
tem.443 Thus, given that a citizen's obligation to obey the law might
lapse in the case of a morally repugnant law,44 4 "[i]t... turns out that in
the only cases where the [argument from negative conse-
437 Simmons, supra note 407, at 291; see also GAs, supra note 378, at 42-43.
438 See supra note 385 and accompanying text.
439 GANs, supra note 378, at 72. Note that the type of disobedience being discussed here
is disobedience on the part of the law's subjects. Disobedience on the part of official actors has
more serious ramifications. Id. at 71, 120-62. For a discussion of the two reasons why disobe-
dience may encourage further disobedience, see id. at 72-73.
440 Running a red light at three o'clock in the morning on a deserted street, for example,
does not automatically result in negative consequences. See Feinberg, supra note 402, at 54.
Many people would consider violations of sodomy statutes to fall into this category. See
TRIne, supra note 70, at § 15-21.
441 G, s, supra note 378, at 66.
442 Id. at 70.
443 Id.
444 See infra notes 463-67 and accompanying text.
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quences] ... could actually be of practical use, it is not available for such
use."445
Regardless of these criticisms, proponents of the argument from
negative consequences continue to believe that it forms a plausible
ground for political obligation.446 It at least grounds an obligation to
obey certain classes of laws, as even its critics concede. Furthermore, if
the theory of political obligation based on negative consequences can
explain only an obligation to obey morally repugnant laws, and not mor-
ally beneficial laws, as its detractors claim, then it has done its job. The
central search in any exploration of political obligation is for an explana-
tion of a citizen's obligation to obey unjust laws. And such an obligation
will not, in every case, lapse because of the moral inadequacy of a
law.447 In a discussion of the grounds for legal obligation contained in A
Theory of Justice, for example, John Rawls explains that "sometimes we
have an obligation to obey what we think, and think correctly, is an un-
just law; and.., sometimes we have an obligation to obey a law even in
a situation where more good ... would seem to result from not doing
so."44 8 Thus the argument from negative consequences may provide a
foundation upon which to position political obligation-especially in
combination with the theories discussed below.449
4. The Argument from Fairness
In John Simmons' critical account of consent theory, he dismisses
the argument from consent as "fail[ing] to give a suitably general ac-
count of our political obligations .... ,,450 At the same time, he writes
that "[c]onsent theory ... seems to point the way toward other avenues
of inquiry which may prove more rewarding. ' 451 He has in mind, among
other things, the principle of fair play embodied in the argument dis-
cussed in this subsection.45 2 Proponents of the argument from fairness
445 GANS, supra note 378, at 70.
446 See e.g., id. at 77-78 (making this argument).
447 See infra text accompanying notes 463-67.
448 John Rawls, Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play, in LAW AND PHILOsOPHY 3,
5 (Sidney Hook ed., 1964) [hereinafter Rawls, Obligation]. Rawls makes this observation in
the midst of a discussion in which he assumes that negative consequences would not flow from
disobedience to law. The quote is used here only to illustrate that the central issue in scholarly
debates on political obligation is whether or not citizens have an obligation to obey unjust
laws.
449 Given the value placed on legal institutions as protectors of civil order, in the words of
Professor Gans, "the bad consequences... [attendant to] many instances of disobedience...
support a[n obligation] to obey the law." GANs, supra note 378, at 77.
450 Simmons, supra note 407, at 291.
451 Id.
452 In analyzing the obligations that may arise from the enjoyment of civil society, ac-
cording to Simmons, "we do not appeal to a principle of consent; rather, such obligations
would arise, if at all, because of considerations of fairness or gratitude." Id. at 288. "[S]ome of
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contend that "[w]hen a number of persons conduct any joint enterprise
according to rules and thus restrict their liberty, those who have submit-
ted to these restrictions when required have a right to a similar submis-
sion from those who have benefitted by their submission. '453 Both H. L.
A. Hart and John Rawls view this "principle of fairness"' 45 4 as a basis for
an obligation to obey the law.455 Implicit in their theories is a notion of
"distributive justice"456 in which the burdens of producing some com-
mon good are preferably borne equally by all of the consumers of that
good.457 Adherence to a principle of fairness would minimize the ex-
ploitation of the producers and would mitigate the "free-rider" problem
in which a non-cooperating individual accepts the benefits produced by
the cooperating individuals. 4
58
Critics of the fairness theory argue that it does not supply a ground
for an obligation to obey the law.459 They point out that at least some
citizens may not wish to cbnsume the goods produced by the legal sys-
tem, and do not do so willingly-yet they cannot opt out of the deal.46 0
The principle of fairness, they argue, cannot apply to goods consumed
unwillingly. 46 1
Locke's consent-implying enjoyments might in fact bind us to political communities under a
'principle of fair play' ... or they might be thought to bind us under a principle of grati-
tude ... or under some other kind of principle of repayment." Id. at 291 (footnotes omitted).
453 GANS, supra note 378, at 57 (quoting H.L.A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64
Pim. REv. 175, 185 (1955)). John Rawls named this "the principle of fairness" and developed
it in first in Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play, and later in A Theory of Justice. Id.;
see RAwI.s, supra note 27, at §§ 18, 52.
454 See RAwLS, supra note 27, at §§ 18, 52.
455 GANS, supra note 378, at 57; See, e.g., RAwLs, supra note 27, at 108-14.
456 GANS, supra note 378, at 58 & n.44.
457 Or at least "all of the consumers capable of participating in the production process."
Id. at 59.
458 The 'Tree-rider" problem arises when an individual reasons that he need make no
contribution to the group effort because the contributions of other group-members will suffice
to bring about the common good. The free-rider thus benefits at the expense of other group-
members. "Each person has his own share to do if all are to gain, but it is possible for a given
person to cheat, not do his share, and thus take his benefit as 'free' only because the others are
doing their shares. The 'free rider' doesn't 'play fair.' He may not harm anybody directly, but
by cheating he exploits the others' cooperativeness to his own benefit." Feinberg, supra note
402, at 53; see also DuKEMmUR, supra note 178, at 51-52 & n. 27.
459 ROBERT NozacK, ANARcHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 90-95 (1974); SIMMONS, supra note
390, at 118-36.
460 These individuals are sometimes called "passive recipients." David Lyons, Lectures in
Resistance and Responsibility at Comell Law School (Fall 1994).
461 Nozick illustrates an instance of unwilling consumption with the following example:
Suppose some residents of a neighborhood agree to create an entertainment center in which
music will be broadcast over a public address system. Suppose further that many residents
have contributed toward the establishment and maintenance of the entertainment center. All of
the residents enjoy its benefits upon opening their windows. Does a resident who has occasion-
ally opened her window, and who has enjoyed the public address system, owe a contribution to
the entertainment center? Not necessarily, according to Nozick. She does not owe a contribu-
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Adherents of the argument from fairness respond to these criticisms
by acknowledging that obligations must arise from voluntary and delib-
erate acts.462 Additionally, in a further refinement of the notion of volun-
tary behavior reminiscent of consent theory, they claim that "it is not
possible to be bound to... institutions which exceed the limits of tolera-
ble injustice. ' 463 Thus an obligation to obey the law arising from the
principle of fairness presupposes that the legal institutions at issue are
"reasonably just"4 6 4 and that the individuals bound by the obligation
have entered into it willingly.465 The argument from fairness would not
characterize an obligation entered into under duress or undue influence
as binding: "[a]cquiescence in, or even consent to, clearly unjust institu-
tions does not give rise to obligations. '466 Many scholars consider the
argument from fairness, so qualified, as a viable foundation upon which
to ground an obligation to obey the law.
467
5. The Argument from Justice
In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls offers an explanation for obedi-
ence to law that exists independently of the principle of fairness. Accord-
ing to Rawls, a duty to support just institutions requires that individuals
"comply with and.., do [their] share in just institutions when they exist
and apply to [them]; and ... assist in the establishment of just arrange-
ments when they do not exist, at least when this can be done with little
cost to ... [the individual]. '468 Natural duties, including the duty to
support just institutions, in contrast to obligations, "apply . . .without
regard to [an individual's] ... voluntary acts."1469 Irrespective of whether
or not an individual has committed herself, tacitly or otherwise, to refrain
from harming others or to aid a person in jeopardy,470 she has a duty to
do so.471 One cannot, for example, argue that a promise to refrain from
killing "establishes a moral requirement where none already existed.
472
A promise not to kill, according to Rawls, is "ludicrously redundant.
473
tion if, for example, she does not think the burden of her contribution is worth the benefit of
the entertainment center, whose creation she did not will. NOZICK, supra note 459, at 93-96.
462 See supra § I(A) (1).
463 RAwLs, supra note 27, at 112 (parenthetical omitted). For a discussion of the principle
of fairness incorporating many of the precepts of consent theory, see id. at 113.
464 Id. at 112.
465 Id. at 343 ("we acquire obligations... by doing various things voluntarily .. .
466 Id.
467 See, e.g., id. at 342-50; GANs, supra note 378, at 57-66.
468 RAwLS, supra note 27, at 334.
469 Id. at 114.
470 She has a natural duty in this instance if she can aid the person without risking exces-
sive injury or loss to herself. Id.
471 Id. at 114-15.
472 Id. at 115.
473 Id.
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Furthermore, natural duties exist independently of any institutional
framework: they "obtain between all [people] as equal moral persons." 474
Thus the argument from justice, in contrast to the argument from fair-
ness, does not depend on the existence of a cooperative social
arrangement.
Rawls explains that individuals may be bound to political institu-
tions in several different ways.475 They may have an obligation to obey
the law based in fairness, as described in the previous subsection; they
may have a duty to comply with the law based on the argument from
justice described in this subsection; and they may be politically bound in
other ways as well.4 76 As between the principle of fairness and the duty
to support just institutions, the latter "is the more fundamental, since it
binds citizens generally and requires no voluntary acts in order to ap-
ply. '477 Those citizens who hold public office or who experience a posi-
tion of relative privilege probably have an obligation as well as a duty to
obey the law because they receive public goods produced by the cooper-
ation of their fellow citizens more readily than do others.478 Disadvan-
taged minorities, who may only minimally benefit from their
community's joint enterprise, probably do not have an obligation to obey
the law based in fairness. Fidelity to law may be required of them, how-
ever, because of their duty to support just institutions. "If the basic struc-
ture of society is just, or as just as it is reasonable to expect in the
circumstances," Rawls comments, "everyone has a natural duty to do his
part in the existing scheme. Each is bound to these institutions independ-
ent of his voluntary acts, performative or otherwise." 479
Critics point to two weaknesses in the argument from justice: first,
individuals have difficulty determining when institutions "apply to
them." 4 0 Second, a natural duty to support just institutions "does not tie
political obligation sufficiently tightly to the particular community to
which those who have the obligation belong; it does not show why [the
British] have any special duty to support the institutions of Britain. '481
Some scholars have suggested overcoming the first criticism by referring
to social custom to determine when certain institutions "apply to" indi-
viduals.482 Others have suggested eliminating the phrase entirely. Resort,
474 Id.
475 Id. at 116.
476 Id.
477 Id.
478 See id. ('The principle of fairness ... binds only those who assume public office, say,
or those who, being better situated, have advanced their aims within the system.").
479 Id. at 115.
480 See GANs, supra note 378, at 78.
481 EMpnm, supra note 389, at 193.
482 GANS, supra note 378, at 79.
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to custom seems the preferable alternative, since omitting the challenged
phrase would mean that the duty to support just institutions recognizes
no geographic borders and thus might become an "impractically
heavy"483 burden. Additionally, it seems intuitively plausible that indi-
viduals might determine when an institution applies to them in the same
way that they discern connections with certain religious, educational or
financial institutions-that is, through the customary practices of their
family and community.
As for the second criticism, Ronald Dworkin has supplied, in the
argument from community, another potential ground for political obliga-
tion that more directly acknowledges the special relationship between an
individual and her government.
6. The Argument from Community
Dworkin argues that the obligations usually thought to attach to fa-
milial relationships and to friendships do not arise from free choice.
"Even associations we consider mainly consensual, like friendship, are
not formed in one act of deliberate contractual commitment, the way one
joins a club. . .. -484 He sees the obligation to obey the law as deriving
from the same source as do these communal obligations and advances
two arguments in anticipatory defense of this "argument from commu-
nity." First, he contends that communal obligations do not require emo-
tional ties or personal relationships between obligor and obligee. They
require only a group ethic in which members "see these responsibilities
as flowing from a more general responsibility each has of concern for the
well-being of others in the group."485 Thus, the members of a political
community, like the members of a family, may have communal obliga-
tions toward one another. Second, Dworkin argues that basing political
obligation on community does not necessarily raise the specter of nation-
alism or racism. 486 Although he recognizes that people often develop
communal sentiments towards persons with whom they share cultural or
other similarities (to the exclusion of those with whom they do not), he
explains that "communal obligations... are limited by the requirements
of justice. '487 In other words Dworkin, like Rawls, believes that individ-
uals have natural duties towards justice and that those duties would over-
ride any communal obligation in contravention to justice. With that
483 Id. at 80 (discussing SIMMONS, supra note 390, at 153).
484 EMPIRE, supra note 389, at 197.
485 Id. at 199-200.
486 GANS, supra note 378, at 85.
487 Id.
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proviso, Dworkin contends, "the more wholesome ideals of national
community" need not be given up.
48 8
7. Summary
According to Joel Feinberg, "[t]he venerable quest for a perfectly
general ground of political obligation can be abandoned."489 Each of the
six arguments described in the preceding subsections has received seri-
ous scholarly criticism; perhaps one cannot successfully ground political
obligation on any of them. But what if several of the arguments were
combined? At least one theorist has suggested that the arguments from
fairness and from justice, when combined with the arguments from nega-
tive consequences and community, do provide a sufficient ground for
fidelity to law.
It turns out that a single complex combining all four ar-
guments supplies the firmest and most successful basis
for political obligation. The argument from [negative]
consequences, the argument from fairness and the argu-
ment [from justice] ... clarify just why obeying the law
is the central component of . . . [political obligation].
The argument from fairness and, to a larger extent, the
argument from [community] ... clarify just why this
duty is... a unique and intimate duty owed by citizens
to the specific communities of which they are members.
The argument from [negative] consequences and the ar-
gument from [justice] ... demonstrate why [political ob-
ligation]. . . is not [merely owed to one's own
community] .... 490
But regardless of the accuracy, or lack thereof, of Feinberg's obser-
vation, each of the six theories described above, and any hybrid of these
theories, contemplates an obligation to law that is merely a prima facie,
488 EwrE, supra note 389, at 206; see also id. at 202-06.
489 FEINBERG, supra note 402, at 58.
490 GA~s, supra note 378, at 89 (using the terms "argument from consequences," "argu-
ment from the duty to support just institutions," and "argument from communal obligations").
Note also that the arguments from fairness and from justice both include an embedded version
of the argument from negative consequences. See id. at 72-74. They assign to individuals an
affirmative obligation to support beneficial social arrangements because lack of support for
such arrangements might result in undesirable consequences for everyone. Stated conversely,
they require obedience to law because disobedience will potentially cause undesirable conse-
quences. Id. at 80-81. Additionally, Rawls' conception of fairness and of the duty to support
just institutions owes a debt to consent theory. See RAWLs, supra note 27, at 118-95. Finally,
Rawls seems to acknowledge obligations based on community, claiming that people engaged
in a group effort to advance a political cause "assume obligatory ties to one another." Id. at
377. He would, however, distinguish those ties from any responsibility based on the duty to
support just institutions. Id.
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or defeasible, obligation. Such an obligation would allow for "justified
rule departures," or circumstances in which the duty to obey the law
would lapse. A debt of gratitude to one's teacher, for example, might
entail obedience to her classroom instructions, but would not include
obedience to an order to hit a classmate. An obligation based on consent,
likewise, can become void; even in the law of contracts, where parties
have given formal and express consent to a certain distribution of rights
and duties, one party's obligation may evaporate if, for instance, the con-
tract was negotiated in a situation involving duress or undue influence.
The same is true for an obligation based on fear of negative conse-
quences or on principles of fairness, justice and community. The next
subsection-in its examination of John Rawls' theory of justice (which
explicitly incorporates the arguments from fairness and from the duty to
support just institutions, and implicitly incorporates those from negative
consequences and from community)-will explore the conditions under
which obligations to the law evaporate.
B. ORDERED LIBERTY & JUSTIFIED RULE DEPARTURES: JOHN RAWLS'
A THEORY OF JUSTICE
A federal court will characterize an interest as "fundamental" for
purposes of equal protection if it views that interest as "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty" such that "neither liberty nor justice would
exist if [it] were sacrificed." 4 9 1 This subsection considers whether equal
participation in the political process satisfies that standard. In order to do
so, it utilizes John Rawls' vision of a well-ordered society as expressed
in A Theory of Justice. It provides the reader with a brief introduction to
Rawls' social vision; discusses justified rule departures in that context;
and concludes that civil disobedience would have been a justifiable re-
sponse to the enactment into law of an anti-gay initiative like the one
struck down in Romer.
1. A Vision of Ordered Liberty
Rawls restricts his treatment of political obligation to a hypothetical,
nearly just society governed by two principles. The first principle-the
liberty principle-requires that each person have "an equal right to the
most extensive liberty compatible with a like liberty for all."'492 It insists
that an unequal distribution of social goods, like wealth, free speech and
association, and "the bases of self-respect" 493 occur only when that dis-
tribution advantages everyone.49 4 The second principle-the principle of
491 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 326 (1937); see supra § I(B) (4).
492 Rawls, Obligation, supra note 448, at 11.
493 RAwLs, supra note 27, at 62.
494 Id.
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equal opportunity-requires (1) that social and economic inequalities ex-
ist only if they most benefit the least advantaged members of society (the
"difference principle") and (2) that such inequalities attach only to posi-
tions open to everyone under conditions of equal opportunity (the "open
offices principle"). 495 A society governed by these two principles neces-
sarily has some form of democratic government in which members of the
community enjoy the benefits of a constitution that secures the freedom
of their person, protects free thought and establishes equal incidents of
citizenship for all through devices such as suffrage. Additionally, citizens
in such a society necessarily utilize some type of majority rule in their
decision-making process. In doing so, they forfeit some modicum of jus-
tice in order to foster the overall efficiency of the legal system. 496
The liberty principle and the difference principle, according to
Rawls, represent a fair and impartial basis upon which to organize human
affairs. He derives them from an imaginary4 97 "original position" in
which individuals have no perception of the personal characteristics that
might prejudice them for purely selfish reasons in favor of a particular
social order. They have no knowledge, for example, of their social status,
their race, their gender or their conception of the good.4 98 They do not
know the quality of their natural abilities or even "their special psycho-
logical propensities." 499 In addition, they "do not know the particular
circumstances of their own society." 500 Rawls calls this a "veil of igno-
rance," the presence of which guarantees that "no one is advantaged or
disadvantaged in the choice of principles. . . . Since all are similarly
495 Id. at 302.
496 See Rawls, Obligation, supra note 448, at 5; RAwLs, supra note 27, at 382 ("I assume
that the society in question is one that is nearly just; and this implies that it has some form of
democratic government."); John Rawls, The Justification of Civil Disobedience, in Civil Diso-
bedience: Theory and Practice 244 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 1969) [hereinafter Rawls, Disobe-
dience] ("the best constitution is some form of democratic regime affirming equal political
liberty and using some sort of majority... rule."). For a discussion of the two purposes of
social institutions (justice and efficiency) and the necessity of majority rule, see id. at 241.
497 He does not think of this original position as an "actual historical state of affairs" or a
"primitive condition of culture." RAwLs, supra note 27, at 12. He thinks of it merely as an
idealized, hypothetical situation. Id.; see also Id. at 120 ("It is clear, then, that the original
position is a purely hypothetical situation.").
498 Note that these individuals are also presumed to be rational decision-makers. For a
discussion of the original position, generally, see READING RAwLs 1-80 (Norman Daniels
ed.,1975); JONATHAN WOLFF, ROBERT NozICK: PROPERTY, Jus'rIc AND THE MINIMAL STATE
119 (1991).
499 RAwLS, supra note 27, at 12. "Nor... does anyone know... the special features of
his psychology such as his aversion to risk or liability to optimism or pessimism." Id. at, 137.
500 Id. In discussing possible disagreement between generations, Rawls even observes that
persons in the original position would not know to which generation they belong; he notes that
"the question of a reasonable genetic policy" might arise. Id. He does not explain this state-
ment, but it would probably not do his work too much damage to analogize this situation to the
situation of lesbian, gay and bisexual people who have been and continue to be subjected to
abuse disguised as treatment to "cure" their unnatural propensities. See supra note 111.
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situated and no one is able to design principles to favor his particular
condition, the [two] principles of justice are the result of a
fair... bargain."
50'
Citizens in a nearly just society governed by those principles act
under a prima facie duty to obey the law grounded in either the principle
of fair play or in the natural duty to promote justice, or in both.502 "[T]he
better-placed members of society are more likely than others to have
political obligations as distinct from political duties," however, since "by
and large it is these persons who are best able to gain political office and
to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the constitutional sys-
tem. o50 3 Their obligation stems from the principle of fair play;5 04 they
have, hypothetically, entered into a social contract in which the mutual
benefits of their cooperative endeavor obtain only if nearly everyone par-
ticipates. 50 5 But even members of disadvantaged groups operate under a
duty to support just institutions and, thus, in a nearly just society, under a
duty to comply with the law. In summary, in Rawls' words, "[c]itizens
generally are bound by the duty of justice, and those who have assumed
favored offices and positions, or who have taken advantage of certain
opportunities to further their interests, are in addition obligated to do
their part by the principle of fairness.
'50 6
But does this obligation or duty extend even to unjust laws? Yes,
according to Rawls-at least within certain limits:
The injustice of a law is not, in general, a sufficient rea-
son for not adhering to it any more than the legal validity
of legislation ... is a sufficient reason for going along
with it. When the basic structure of society is reasonably
just... we are to recognize unjust laws as binding pro-
vided that they do not exceed certain limits of
injustice.507
501 RAWLS, supra note 27, at 12.
502 The principle of fair play is based on the notion that when people submit to limitations
on their liberty in order to conduct a joint enterprise, all those who have submitted have a right
to a similar submission from those who benefit from the enterprise. See supra § HI(A) ((4).
Rawls considers the principle of fairness, along with the natural duty to support just institu-
tions (or the duty to promote justice) to be a basis for the obligation to obey the law. Thus in a
nearly just society, the prima facie obligation to obey the law would rest on both a principle of
fairness and on a duty to support just institutions. For a discussion of the principle of fairness,
see Rawls, supra note 448, at 5; RAwLS, supra note 27, at 342-50.
503 Id. at 344.
504 Id. at 342.
505 "[A] society satisfying the principles of justice as fairness comes as close as a society
can to being a voluntary scheme, for it meets the principles which free and equal persons
would assent to under circumstances that are fair." Id. at 13.
506 Id. at 350.
507 Id. at 350-51.
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Thus, although a duty-or for some, an obligation-to comply with laws
enacted by the legislative majority 50 8 exists, it is not absolute. Rawls
contends that even in a nearly just society "some serious violations of
justice nevertheless do occur. '509 A citizen's natural duty to oppose in-
justice will therefore sometimes trump her obligation to obey the law.5 10
The behavior demanded by the law and the behavior demanded by jus-
tice may come into conflict.511 When this occurs, and when the conflict
is severe, civil disobedience and conscientious objection, or even militant
resistance, may become appropriate.5 12
2. Justified Rule Departures
Even in Rawls' nearly just society, then, some injustice, resulting
from the necessity of majority rule, inevitably arises. When the delegates
to a hypothetical constitutional convention, sitting in the original posi-
tion, adopt the principle of majority rule, they "agree to put up with un-
just laws." 513 But they do so only within the limitations imposed by the
two principles of justice: permanent minorities that bear the burden of
injustice for many years, and those who sympathize with them, need not
acquiesce in a denial of basic liberties, exemplified by an unjust law,
since individuals in the original position would not have understood such
acquiescence as a necessary adjunct to majority rule.
5 14
But given a prima facie obligation (or duty) to obey even unjust
laws, how does one determine when disobedience to law is appropriate?
Although Rawls admits that every person confronted with an unjust law
"must ... settle this question for himself," he nevertheless offers three
criteria by which to guide the analysis.515 First, justified civil disobedi-
ence protests a serious breach of the liberty principle or a blatant viola-
tion of the principle of equal opportunity. Second, it usually occurs only
after normal appeals to the political majority, made in good faith, have
failed.5 16 And third, it allows those similarly situated to protest similarly
without jeopardizing the survival of mutually beneficial institutions. A
508 Laws might also be enacted by an executive or by some other body subject to the
constraints of majority rule decision-making.
509 RAwLS, supra note 27, at 363.
510 Id. at 376.
511 Id. at 349.
512 Id. at 351.
513 Id. at 355.
514 Id.
515 Rawls, Disobedience, supra note 496, at 254. Note that Rawls does not intend these
three criteria to be exhaustive: "These conditions are not, I think, exhaustive but they seem to
cover the more obvious points .... "Id. at 251-52.
516 Note that "[t]his conditions is, however, a presumption. Some cases may be so ex-
treme that there may be no duty to use first only legal means of political opposition." RAwLs,
supra note 27, at 373.
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protester establishes her right to justifiably disobey the law by satisfying
these three criteria.
517
a. Anti-Gay Initiatives Violate the First Principle of Justice
If enacted, Amendment Two and other anti-gay initiatives would
have satisfied the first of these criteria; they would have seriously
breached the liberty principle by preventing lesbian, gay and bisexual
people from participating equally in the political process.518 This subsec-
tion presents two arguments in support of this conclusion.
First, anti-gay initiatives like Amendment Two would have placed
obstacles in the path of those seeking to eliminate certain, specified in-
justices. In the communities in which these initiatives became law, les-
bian, gay and bisexual people would have had no legal recourse from
discrimination in housing, employment and other areas. They would
have been able to secure the passage of gay-protective legislation only by
first amending their state constitution; in order to do so, they would have
needed to either obtain a supermajority of votes in their state legislature,
hold a constitutional convention, or appeal through the initiative process
to the same democratic body that had truncated their rights in the first
place. Other groups would have been able to secure the passage of pro-
tective legislation by garnishing the support of a simple majority of their
legislators-a much easier task.519 These initiatives, therefore, quite lit-
erally would have "obstruct[ed] the path to removing ... injustices. ' 520
And they would have done so, furthermore, by "publicly incorporat[ing
themselves] into ... the letter, of social arrangements.' 521 According to
Rawls, citizens may legitimately use civil disobedience to protest a mea-
sure that does such things.5 22 This type of measure must, then, by neces-
sary corollary, violate at least one of the principles of justice.
517 She must still ask herself, however, whether wisdom and prudence counsel restraint in
her particular circumstances. That is, will civil disobedience further her ends?
518 Amendment Two may, additionally, violate the principle of equal opportunity. The
social and economic inequalities experienced by lesbian, gay and bisexual people as a result of
housing and employment discrimination do not somehow benefit the least advantaged mem-
bers of society. In fact, one could characterize lesbian, gay and bisexual people as among the
lesser advantaged members of the community. See supra § I(A). Because Amendment Two
tacitly endorses, and perhaps even fosters, such discrimination, it may thus constitute a viola-
tion of the second principle of justice. This Note will, however, examine Amendment Two
primarily in the context of the first principle of justice.
519 See supra footnotes 100-04 and accompanying text (discussing the obstacles that
Amendment Two would place in the way of lesbian, gay and bisexual voters, as compared to
the obstacles faced by other members of the Colorado community).
520 RAwLS, supra note 27, at 372.
521 Id.
522 Id.
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In fact, Rawls specifically discusses a "principle of (equal) partici-
pation ' 523 in the political process in the context of the first principle of
justice. He describes it as follows: "[t]he principle of equal lib-
erty... requires that all citizens... have an equal right to take part in,
and to determine the outcome of... the... process that establishes the
laws with which they are to comply. ''5 24 This brings to light the second
reason that anti-gay initiatives, if enacted, would have violated the liberty
principle: they would have created constitutions-or other legal
frameworks-which would have denied to one group an equal opportu-
nity to influence the political process. According to Rawls, a constitution
must underwrite a fair opportunity to take part in and to
influence the political process.
* All citizens... should be in a position to assess
how proposals affect their well-being and which policies
advance their conception of the public good. Moreover,
they should have a fair chance to add alternative propos-
als to the agenda for political discussion. The liberties
protected by the principle of participation lose much of
their value whenever those who have greater private
means are permitted to use their advantages to control
the course of public debate. For eventually these ine-
qualities will enable those better situated to exercise a
larger influence over the development of legislation. In
due time they are likely to acquire a preponderant weight
in settling social questions, at least in regard to those
matters upon which they normally agree, which is to say
in regard to those things that support their favored
circumstances. 52
The Colorado Constitution, as altered by Amendment Two, would
have failed in at least two ways to underwrite a fair political opportunity
523 Id. at 221.
524 Id. The quote actually reads: "The principle of equal liberty . . requires that all
citizens... have an equal right to take part in, and to determine the outcome of, the constitu-
tional process that establishes the laws with which they are to comply." Id. (emphasis added).
Although Rawls discusses political participation in the context of constitutional conventions
and amendments in this section of A Theory of Justice, I believe that his conception of political
participation is broader, extending also to the legislative process in which citizens are more
typically involved. One could argue that the initiative process which resulted in Amendment
Two's potential alteration of the Colorado Constitution satisfies Rawls' definition of equal
political participation quoted above. Lesbian, gay and bisexual people, and their supporters,
had, after all, as much ability as any other citizens to cast their ballots against Amendment
Two. But its alteration of the framework' of political liberty in Colorado would produce a
situation in which Rawls' version of equal political participation would not, in regards to the
usual legislative process by which laws are created, exist.
525 Id. at 224-225 (footnote omitted).
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as described by Rawls. First, it would have prevented lesbian, gay and
bisexual people from having a "fair chance to add alternative proposals
to the agenda for political discussion." As the State of Colorado itself
argued, Amendment Two would have created a "provisional resolution
of controversial issues . . . ." by "[r]emoving [them] . . .from concen-
trated local majorities . *."..,526 Itwould have decided, in other words,
essentially once and for all, whether communities should provide their
lesbian, gay and bisexual citizens with protection from such things as
housing and employment discrimination. Alternative viewpoints would
have had only a minimal chance of becoming law.
Second, it would have reduced the value of political participation
for the queer community by explicitly weighing the future votes of les-
bian, gay and bisexual people lower than the average vote.527 In addition,
although the proponents of Amendment Two may not have possessed
financial resources greater than those of its opponents, they did benefit
from the privileged status of their presumed heterosexuality-and they
used that privilege to control the course of public debate in Colorado.528
One could argue that this privileged position allowed them to "acquire a
preponderant weight in settling [a] social question[ ]" and to create a law
favoring their circumstances. This state of affairs opened the door for a
law that reflected a vision of justice adhered to by only the dominant
class. And such a vision, according to Rawls, is "in many cases clearly
unjust."
52 9
b. Anti-Gay Initiatives' Violation of the Liberty Principle
Cannot be Justified
Assume momentarily that the analysis above correctly concludes
that Amendment Two and other anti-gay initiatives, if enacted, would
have created inequalities in liberty. One could still justify the existence
of such initiatives by showing that these laws "[made] everyone better
526 Appellants-Defendants' Opening Brief at 50, 51, Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335
(Colo. 1994) (Nos. 94-SA-048 and 94-SA-128 (consolidated)), aff'd, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
527 Rawls contends that "the worth of liberty to persons and groups is proportional to their
capacity to advance their ends within the framework the system defines." RAwLS, supra note
27, at 204. He observes that "political liberty is unequal ... if the votes of some are weighted
much more heavily, or if a segment of society is without the franchise altogether." Id. at 247.
If Amendment Two became law, the lesbian, gay and bisexual community would need to
amend their state constitution in order to enact pro-gay legislation. They would need a
supermajority in their state legislature to do so. Thus, one pro-gay vote would be worth less
than a normal vote.
528 See Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp.
417, 443 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (discussing the "grossly inaccurate campaign ads" made available
by supporters of Issue Three through "the media, mailings, and other sources"), aff'd in part,
vacated in part, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995), vacated, 116 S.Ct. 2519 (1996) (remanding in
light of Romer, 116 S.Ct. 1620 (1996)).
529 RAWLS, supra note 27, at 352.
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off than in [the] ... hypothetical starting situation. ' '530 In order to do so,
one would have to assess the scheme of liberty they produced "from the
standpoint of the representative equal citizen."'531 One would have to ask
whether a rational person in the original position would choose a scheme
of liberty in which lesbian, gay and bisexual people suffered a limitation
on their ability to participate in the political process.
According to Rawls, an individual in the original position would
accept a limitation on liberty only if that limitation would result in
broader protection for the liberty in question or for another liberty. She
would accept a limitation on liberty, in other words, only in order to
achieve the best total system of liberties.5 32 This subsection presents and
refutes several arguments of this type in favor of anti-gay initiatives.
5 33
An initial objection to the analysis presented above (and to the con-
clusion that Amendment Two would have violated the first principle of
justice) might center on the difficulty of identifying breaches of the lib-
erty principle. How can members of the community-with their varying
approaches to justice-agree on what constitutes a violation of the lib-
erty or equal opportunity principles? Rawls admits that one cannot al-
ways easily determine whether any given law satisfies the principles of
justice. The first clause of the second principle (the difference principle)
is subject to theoretical and speculative beliefs regarding the best way to
satisfy its requirement that inequalities advantage everyone. Conse-
quently, the community may have difficulty in reaching a consensus on
the question of whether a violation of the difference principle has oc-
curred. Certain violations of the liberty principle and of the open offices
clause of the second principle, however, are easily detected. Denying a
minority the right to vote, or restricting its members' access to political
offices are obvious violations, according to Rawls. When civil disobedi-
530 Id. at 62. In the hypothetical starting situation, each individual possesses an equal
share of social goods such as liberty. Id.
531 Id. at 204.
532 Id. "liberty is represented by the complete system of the liberties of equal citizenship
• ." Id.
533 Note that the State of Colorado offered six arguments in favor of Amendment Two.
First, it argued that Amendment Two would "protect[ ] the sanctity of personal, familial, an
religious privacy." Appellants-Defendants' Opening Brief at 23, Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d
1335 (Colo. 1994) (Nos. 94-SA-048 and 94-SA-128 (consolidated)), aft'd, 116 S. Ct. 1620
(1996). Second, it argued that Amendment Two would "preserve[ ] the ability of the State to
remedy discrimination [sic] against suspect classes." Id. at 27-28. Third, it argued that the
amendment would "allow[] the People Themselves to Establish Public Social and Moral
Norms." Id. at 36. Fourth, it argued that the amendment would "prevent[] the government
from supporting the political objectives of a special interest group." Id. at 43. Finally, it argued
that the amendment would "Deter Factionalism Through Ensuring That [sic] Decisions Re-
garding Special Protections for Homosexuals and Bisexuals Are [sic] Made at the Highest
Level of Government." Id. at 44. This subsection does not analyze these arguments
specifically.
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ence is limited to these types of injustices, differences in opinion about
the best method by which to effectuate first principles do not cloud the
discourse.
A second argument in favor of Amendment Two might center on
the benefits of the plebiscite process. Many people would characterize
that process, and the principle of majority rule which it incorporates, as
representing democracy at its best.534 If immersed in Rawls' theories,
they might point out that one must, in evaluating the justness of any
given law, view that law in the larger context of the rights and duties
established by the major social institutions. 535 One does not look at each
specific liberty, but at "the system of liberty as a whole ... *-536 They
might argue that, in the case of anti-gay initiatives, two liberties are in
conflict. On the one hand resides the liberty represented by the principle
of majority rule; on the other resides the liberty represented by equal
participation in the political process.5 37 Perhaps Amendment Two would
have struck the best balance between competing liberties, from the stand-
point of the original position.5
38
This argument fails for three reasons. First, majority rule for its own
sake will not overcome the necessity for background justice, including
the "freedom to take part in public affairs and to influence by constitu-
tional means the course of legislation-and the guarantee of the fair
value of these freedoms."539 This is, according to Rawls, "a fundamental
part of the majority principle .... -54o In a homogeneous society, he
observes, "the various sectors... [would] have reasonable confidence in
534 Charlow, supra note 65, at 528.
535 RAwLs, supra note 27, at 63.
536 Id. at 203.
537 In fact, supporters of Amendment Two could even attempt to marshall Rawls' defini-
tion of equal political participation in their favor by noting that, according to Rawls, "the main
variation in the extent of equal political liberty [defined by the principle of participation] lies
in the degree to which the constitution is majoritarian." Id. at 224. Under this view, if the
Supreme Court prevents the majority from making this decision regarding gay rights it will
have limited equal political liberty. But Rawls words really only expose the stark competition
between the liberty principle embodied in majority rule and the liberty interest embodied in
equal participation in the political process. He contends, for example, that "[wihenever the
constitution limits the scope and authority of majorities, either by requiring a greater plurality
for certain types of measures, or by a bill of rights restricting the powers of the legislature, and
the like, equal political liberty is less extensive." Id. Amendment Two would require a greater
plurality for measures designed to protect the interests of lesbian, gay and bisexual people;
thus, Amendment Two would, according to Rawls, reduce the scope of equal political liberty.
But if the Supreme Court strikes down Amendment Two as violative of the Equal Protection
Clause, the federal Bill of Rights will have restricted the power of state legislatures and elec-
torates, likewise reducing the scope of equal political liberty. The question this subsection
examines, of course, is which scheme of limitations comports best with the principles of
justice.
538 See id. at 203.
539 Id. at 356.
540 Id.
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one another and share a common conception of justice .... "541 Simple
majority rule may, therefore, in such a society, operate fairly well. But in
a heterogeneous society, like the United States, majority rule may not
result in fair outcomes. To the extent that members of a community fail
to share a common conception of justice, "the majority principle be-
comes more difficult to justify," Rawls observes, "because it is less prob-
able that just policies will be followed." 542 He notes specifically that
"[s]poradic and unpredictable tests of public sentiment by plebi-
scite.., do not suffice for a representative regime."543 As demonstrated
above, Amendment Two did not, on its faces, leave lesbian, gay and
bisexual people with the same power to influence the lawmaking process
as other citizens possess. At a minimum, it attempted to create a political
scheme in which queer political participation would not be fairly valued.
Second, a rational delegate to a (hypothetical) constitutional con-
vention, cloaked in a veil of ignorance and guided by the two principles
of justice, would probably refuse to ratify a law that made it more diffi-
cult for a subjected minority to receive governmental redress for its suf-
fering. Such a delegate would, in fact, accept the political inequality
created by an anti-gay initiative only if "similar restrictions appl[ied] to
everyone and... [its] constraints... [would be] likely over time to fall
evenly upon all sectors of society."544 Amendment Two would fail this
test. Its mandate would have affected only the lesbian, gay and bisexual
community. Only that community, in seeking to enact gay-protective leg-
islation, would have had to surmount its hurdles. Only that community
would have had to hold a constitutional convention, direct an initiative at
a constituency with an expressed hostility to its interests, or achieve a
supermajority in the state legislature in order to pass the laws favored by
its members. No other community would have faced such obstacles in its
attempt to enact favorable laws.545 The political inequality that anti-gay
initiatives would have created most decidedly would not have fallen
equally upon all segments of society and, therefore, a rational person in
the original position would not agree to such a measure.
Finally, if a conflict between two liberties-majority rule and polit-
ical participation-does exist, the principles of justice favor the latter. In
other words, a person occupying the original position would accept an
Equal Protection Clause that prevented majorities from enacting anti-gay
initiatives. According to Rawls, the principles of justice allow both sub-
stantive and procedural limitations on majority rule as long as those limi-
541 Id. at 231.
542 Id.
543 Id. at 222.
544 Id. at 224.
545 See supra § I(A)(3).
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tations fall equally upon everyone.5 46 The necessity of majority rule
might in fact, in a nearly just society, require these constraints in order to
safeguard the liberty interests of minority groups:
Unlimited majority rule is often thought to be hostile
to . . . [various] liberties. Constitutional arrangements
[such as separation of powers with judicial review] com-
pel a majority to delay putting its will into effect and
force it to make a more considered and deliberate deci-
sion. In this and other ways procedural [and substantive]
constraints are said to mitigate the defects of the major-
ity principle. The justification appeals to a greater equal
liberty.5 47
A third argument in favor of Amendment Two might focus on the
allegedly perverse nature of homosexuality. Proponents of this argument
might contend that lesbian, gay and bisexual persons suffer from a sick-
ness manifested by their sexual orientation. They might argue that a ra-
tional delegate to an original constitutional convention would accept a
law limiting the ability of homosexuals to enact legislation favoring their
community. Under this theory, pro-gay legislation would, after all, only
exacerbate homosexuals' disorders and prevent them from seeking a
cure.548 Proponents might analogize to the criminal law, noting that
Rawls explains the existence of that body of law as follows:
[i]t is... rational for... [persons in the original posi-
tion] to protect themselves against their own irrational
inclinations by consenting to a scheme of penalties that
may give them a sufficient motive to avoid foolish ac-
tions and by accepting certain impositions designed to
undo the unfortunate consequences of their imprudent
behavior.54
9
He calls such laws "patemalis[tic]," 550 explaining that delegates to an
original constitutional convention would accept them in order to "protect
themselves against the weakness and infirmities of their reason and will
in society. ''551 Paternalistic laws, in fact, encompass more than just crim-
inal laws. They include laws such as those that circumscribe the legal
546 See RAwLs, supra note 27, at 228.
547 Id. at 229.
548 Of course, according to the American Psychological Union, homosexuality is not a
mental defect or illness.
549 RAwLS, supra note 27, at 249.
550 Id.
551 Id.
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capacity of children. Term limits, prohibitions on gambling, and state
limitations on abortion funding might also qualify as "paternalistic.
'552
But a person in the original position would not ratify paternalistic
laws designed to discourage lesbian, gay and bisexual people from em-
bracing their sexual orientation as healthy and normal-or a law, like
Amendment Two, designed to prevent them from passing legislation that
favors their community-because the proponents of such laws could not
convincingly "argue that with the development or the recovery of his
rational powers the individual in question. . . [would] accept ... [the]
decision on his behalf and agree... that ... [it was] the best thing for
him."55 3 Heterosexuals have already subjected lesbian, gay and bisexual
people to an arsenal of treatments designed to cure their alleged devi-
ancy. Reputable health professionals now condemn such techniques as
both ineffective and inhumane. It is unlikely, then, that a lesbian would,
after undergoing such treatment and ultimately rejecting her sexual at-
traction to women (or, from the point of view of proponents of anti-gay
laws, upon "recovering her rational powers") characterize the laws that
caused that rejection as the "best thing" for her. On the contrary, even if
her heterosexual benefactors convinced her that homosexuality was devi-
ant, she would probably nevertheless feel a sense of loss and of awk-
wardness in her new heterosexual role.
But even supposing that this analysis is wrong, and a person would,
after having undergone such treatment, embrace heterosexuality both as a
part of her identity and as the only normal sexual orientation, a rational
person occupying the original position would not condone anti-gay laws
such as Amendment Two. She could only endorse such paternalistic laws
if the object of those laws (lesbian, gay and bisexual people and, perhaps,
their supporters) lacked the capacity for reason. "[P]aternalistic interven-
tion must," in other words, "be justified by the evident failure or absence
of reason and will; and it must be guided by the principles of justice and
what is known about the subject's more permanent aims and preferences
. . . ."554 A rational delegate to a hypothetical constitutional convention,
sitting in the original position could not, therefore, justify anti-gay initia-
tives because, first, such initiatives ignore the long-term aims and prefer-
ences of lesbian, gay and bisexual people and because, second, lesbian,
gay and bisexual people possess the ability to reason.
552 See supra § I(C) (2) (d) (differentiating laws that discriminate against, say, gamblers,
from those that discriminate against lesbian, gay and bisexual people). This analysis may pro-
vide guidance for determining which laws single out "identifiable groups" and which laws do
not.
553 RAwts, supra note 27, at 249.
554 Id. at 250.
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In regard to the first proposition-that anti-gay initiatives ignore the
long-term aims and preferences of lesbian, gay and bisexual people-
consider the following hypothetical offered by Rawls:
[I]magine two persons in full possession of their reason
and will who affirm different religious or philosophical
beliefs; and suppose that there is some psychological
process that will convert each to the other's view, de-
spite the fact that the process is imposed on them against
their wishes. In due course, let us suppose, both will
come to accept conscientiously their new beliefs. We are
still not permitted to submit them to this treatment.555
Subjecting the individuals described in the hypothetical to the treatment
at issue would amount to an attack on their personal integrity and beliefs.
Rawls counsels against such attacks, warning that "[p]aternalistic princi-
ples are a protection against our own irrationality, and must not be inter-
preted to license assaults on one's convictions and character by any
means so long as these offer the prospect of securing consent later
on. ' '556 Thus, if some method existed by which doctors could transform
homosexuals into heterosexuals-and if those persons so transformed
would appreciate and understand and even endorse paternalistic laws
designed to protect them against their own "unnatural" predilections-
one could still not conclude that anti-gay laws would justifiably reduce
the individual liberty of lesbian, gay and bisexual people. Treatments and
laws designed to turn queer people into straight people do not satisfy the
precepts of justice.
In regards to the second proposition-that paternalistic anti-gay
laws fly in the face of lesbian, gay and bisexual people's capacity for
reason-consider a variation on this third argument in favor of Amend-
ment Two that takes the notion of homosexuals-as-deviants even further.
Proponents of this argument might contend that a lesbian's (or gay man's
or bisexual's) need to engage in same-sex erotic activity, like a homicidal
maniac's pathological need to murder, is so immoral that it would justify
a deprivation of liberty in the form of laws discouraging homosexual-
ity-even from the perspective of the original position. This argument
would fail because lesbian, gay and bisexual people, in contrast to homi-
cidal maniacs, possess the capacity for moral decision-making. Accord-
ing to Rawls,
555 Id. at 249-50. This example is chillingly reminiscent of the inhumane treatments to
which lesbian, gay and bisexual persons have been, and still are, subjected. See supra note
Ill.
556 RAWLS, supra note 27, at 250.
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the sufficient condition for equal justice, the capacity for
moral personality, is not at all stringent. When someone
lacks the requisite potentiality either from birth or acci-
dent, this is regarded as a defect or deprivation. There is
no race or recognized group of human beings that lacks
this attribute.... [P]rovided the minimum for moral per-
sonality is satisfied, a person is owed all the guarantees
of justice.
557
In order to entirely lack the capacity for moral decision-making, then, an
individual must suffer from a mental defect, such as mental retardation,
autism, or a pathological disease such as homicidal mania, that would
render her incapable of having (1) a conception of the good exemplified
by a rational plan of life and (2) a sense of justice. The overwhelming
majority of individuals fall outside this category; presumably only ani-
.mals (other than humans) uniformly lack these capacities. 558 Moral be-
ings, furthermore, owe one another a duty of respect, according to Rawls,
and they can express that duty of respect "in several ways: in... [their]
willingness to see the situation of others from their point of view, from
the perspective of their conception of their good; and in... [their] being
prepared to give reasons for ... [their] actions whenever the interests of
others are materially affected." 559 They must offer these reasons in good
faith, such that someone disadvantaged by their actions would reasonably
"accept the constraints on his conduct."560Again, lesbian, gay and bisex-
ual people would not likely accept the constraints on their conduct repre-
sented by laws like Amendment Two.
A fourth argument in favor of Amendment Two might, like the sec-
ond argument above, focus on an alleged conflict between two liberties.
Proponents of this argument might contend that Amendment Two struck
the appropriate balance between participatory liberties and religious and
other liberties by permitting discrimination based on sexual orientation in
housing and employment. This argument also fails. A person in the origi-
nal position, unaware of her race, her gender or her sexual orientation,
would not, for at least two reasons, accept the balance struck by Amend-
ment Two. First, one cannot, according to Rawls, "jus-
tify... [infringements of liberty] on the ground that the disadvantages of
those in one position are outweighed by the greater advantages of those
in another."561 The fact that Amendment Two would have resulted in
557 Id. at 506-07.
558 Id. at 505.
559 Id. at 337.
560 Id. at 338.
561 Id. at 64-65.
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greater religious and other freedoms for employers and landlords is,
therefore, irrelevant.
Second, the liberty principle requires that each person have a co-
equal right to the most extensive liberty feasible. Amendment Two
would have circumscribed the liberty of lesbian, gay and bisexual citi-
zens. In order to justify that circumscription, the ability of the Colorado
community to enjoy maximum liberty would have had to practically ne-
cessitate Amendment Two. But Amendment Two did not assure every
individual a co-equal right to the most extensive liberty feasible; maxi-
mum liberty does not, in other words, require an anti-gay initiative. Con-
sider the following illustration. Imagine the social goods guaranteed by
the Colorado Constitution as together constituting a layer cake.562 As-
suming that equally-sized pieces of that cake would represent a fair divi-
sion of social goods, and assuming that, in order to encourage a fair
division, the person cutting the cake must take the last piece, that person
"will divide the cake equally, since in this way he assures for himself the
largest share possible."563 The citizens who voted for Amendment Two
did not, however, act in this manner. They cut the cake unequally and
they failed to take the last piece. In fact, they selected for themselves the
largest piece of cake (or at least a piece larger than that reserved for the
lesbian, gay and bisexual community). The layer cake example indicates
that a procedure which would guarantee just outcomes exists. One can
evaluate the results of Amendment Two independently from the sub-
stance of those results; one can simply look to the procedure embodied in
Amendment Two and see that it is not fair.
This subsection has presented several arguments on behalf of anti-
gay initiatives like Amendment Two. It has demonstrated that each of
those arguments fails. Amendment Two and other anti-gay initiatives, if
enacted, would have violated the principles of justice. Their proponents
could have justified these laws only if they would have resulted in
broader protection for the liberty in question or in broader protection for
an entirely different liberty. Moreover, they would have had to direct this
justification at the lesbian, gay and bisexual community:
[a]n inequality in the basic [political] structure must al-
ways be justified to those in the disadvantaged position.
This holds whatever the primary social good and espe-
cially for liberty. Therefore... [one must] show that the
inequality of right would be accepted by the less favored
in return for the greater protection of their other liberties
that results from this restriction. 564
562 This example is based on one presented by Rawls. See Id. at 85,
563 Id.
564 Id. at 231.
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The proponents of Amendment Two and laws like it could not have ac-
complished this task. They could not have demonstrated that limitations
on lesbian, gay and bisexual political participation would have created
the best total system of liberties because, in fact, they would have done
the opposite. By barring protective legislation for homosexuals, these
laws would have done damage to the idea of co-equal liberty.
3. Equal Political Participation is Implicit in the Concept of
Ordered Liberty
This subsection argues that equal political participation is implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty such that its elimination would threaten
liberty and justice. If enacted, anti-gay amendments, as breaches of the
liberty principle-or as breaches of the basic building-blocks of ordered
liberty-would have undermined the obligation or duty to obey the law.
The lesbian, gay and bisexual community could have justifiably re-
sponded to such laws with civil disobedience. Such behavior would not
in itself have necessarily threatened liberty and justice. But the behavior
of the majority, if it ignored the queer community's plea for relief, would
have threatened the rule of law and, by extension, liberty and justice. The
Romer Court ruled correctly, therefore, giving voice to a principle of
equal political participation even while avoiding a discussion of funda-
mental rights.
a. Justified Civil Disobedience
Recall the criteria by which one must decide whether one's prima
facie obligation (or duty) to obey even unjust laws has ceased to exist. A
serious breach of the liberty principle or a blatant violation of the princi-
ple of equal opportunity must have occurred and normal appeals to the
political majority, made in good faith, must have failed.565 A protester
establishes her right to justifiably disobey the law by satisfying these
criteria. The previous subsections demonstrated that Amendment Two, if
enacted, would have satisfied the first requirement: its results would have
represented a serious and indefensible breach of the liberty principle. If
the Supreme Court had upheld Amendment Two, concluding that it did
not offend the Equal Protection Clause, the second requirement would
have been satisfied: the normal means of redress-resort to the ballot and
to an independent judiciary-would have failed. Thus the lesbian, gay
and bisexual community would have met the prerequisites to justified
civil disobedience laid down by Rawls.566
565 See supra § II(B) (2) (b).
566 Citizens of a nearly just society should, according to Rawls, only rarely resort to civil
disobedience. They should, for example, in the usual case, practice civil disobedience only
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b. The Rule of Law
One should not view civil disobedience as an irrational or emotional
response to perceived injustice. On the contrary, it evidences a basic ac-
ceptance of the rule of law and provides a tool of last resort to those
seeking to correct a departure from justice. Rawls argues that legitimate,
properly exercised civil disobedience, guided by the criteria above,
would in fact serve to stabilize a nearly just society. "[O]nce society is
interpreted as a scheme of cooperation among equals," in contrast to a
sovereign backed by the natural order of God's will, according to Rawls,
those injured by serious injustice need not submit. In-
deed, civil disobedience... is one of the stabilizing de-
vices of a constitutional system, although by definition
an illegal one. Along with such things as free and regular
elections and an independent judiciary . . ., civil disobe-
dience used with due restraint and sound judgment helps
to maintain and strengthen just institutions. By resisting
injustice within the limits of fidelity to law, it serves to
inhibit departures from justice and to correct them when
they occur. A general disposition to engage in justified
civil disobedience introduces stability into a well-or-
dered society, or one that is nearly just.5 67
When the majority ignores such pleas, endorsing departures from jus-
tice-and perpetuating situations in which the duty to obey the law is
after they have made attempts to change the law in keeping with the procedures of the existing
system. In Rawls' words, civil disobedience should occur only after
the normal appeals to the political majority have already been made in good faith
and... have failed. The legal means of redress have proved of no avail.... At-
tempts to have the laws repealed have been ignored and legal protests and demon-
strations have had no success. Since civil disobedience is a last resort, we should be
sure that it is necessary.
RAwLS, supra note 27, at 373. But, although protestors must request change through the nor-
mal political processes, they need not exhaust those legal means. Id. "[I]f past actions have
shown the majority [to be] immovable or apathetic," according to Rawls, "further attempts
may reasonably be thought fruitless, and a second condition for justified civil disobedience is
met." Id. In some cases, in fact, citizens can justifiably utilize civil disobedience, or even
militant resistance, without first appealing to the majority through normal political channels:
Some cases may be so extreme that there may be no duty to use first only legal
means of political opposition. If, for example, the legislature were to enact some
outrageous violation of equal liberty, say by forbidding the religion of a weak and
defenseless minority, we surely could not expect that sect to oppose the law by
normal political procedures. Indeed, even civil disobedience might be much too
mild, the majority having already convicted itself of wantonly unjust and overtly
hostile aims. Id.
So, in the case of Amendment Two, at least civil disobedience is justified, and possibly even
more drastic means of political protest.
567 Id. at 383.
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absent-its behavior threatens the rule of law. And because the stability
of a nearly just society depends at least partially on fidelity to law, a
threat to the rule of law itself threatens the stability of the society. The
responsibility for the resulting instability rests not with the protester but
with the majority's refusal to adhere to the principles of justice. For if the
majority responds to the protesters by rectifying the departure from jus-
tice, the rule of law and the two guiding principles of the nearly just
society are safe. Civil disobedience thus "helps to maintain and
strengthen just institutions. '568 It functions prophylactically to check the
tyranny of majority rule. According to Rawls, anarchy would result from
civil disobedience only if members of the majority prove unreceptive to
this call to their consciences. If civil disobedience threatened the peace,
the responsibility, according to Rawls, would fall "not so much on those
who protest as upon those whose abuse of authority and power justifies
such opposition."
569
In the process of stabilizing society, civil disobedience also ad-
vances political equality. It ensures, among other things, that each citizen
has an equal voice in the communal decision-making process.570 It en-
hances individual self-esteem and the "political competence of the aver-
age citizen. '571 According to John Stuart Mill, "this education to public
spirit is necessary if citizens are to acquire an affirmative sense of polit-
ical duty and obligation .... -572 Thus the constitution of a democracy
like the United States should provide protection for political equality; it
should ensure that citizens have a civic consciousness that gives rise to a
sense of fidelity to law. "Without these more inclusive sentiments," ac-
cording to Rawls,
568 Id.
569 Rawls, Disobedience, supra note 496, at 255.
570 RAWIs, supra note 27, at 233.
571 Id. at 234. "[P]ublic recognition of the two principles gives greater support to men's
self-respect and this in turn increases the effectiveness of social cooperation. Both effects are
reasons for choosing these principles. It is clearly rational for men to secure their self-respect.
A sense of their own worth is necessary if they are to pursue their conception of the good with
zest and to delight in its fulfillment. Self-respect is not so much a part of any rational plan of
life as the sense that one's plan is worth carrying out. Now our self-respect normally depends
upon the respect of others. Unless we feel that our endeavors are honored by them, it is diffi-
cult if not impossible for us to maintain the conviction that our ends are worth advancing.
Hence for this reason the parties would accept the natural duty of mutual respect which asks
them to treat one another civilly and to be willing to explain the grounds of their actions,
especially when the claims of others are overruled. Moreover, one may assume that those who
respect themselves are more likely to respect each other and conversely. Self-contempt leads to
contempt of others and threatens their good as much as envy does. Self-respect is reciprocally
self-supporting." Id. at 178-79 (citations omitted). "[T]he central place of the primary good of
self-respect and the desire of human beings to express their nature in a free social union with
others." Id. at 543.
572 Id. at 234 (quoting Mill).
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men become estranged and isolated in their smaller as-
sociations, and affective ties may not extend outside the
family or a narrow circle of friends. Citizens no longer
regard one another as associates with whom one can co-
operate to advance some interpretation of the public
good; instead, they view themselves as rivals, or else as
obstacles to one another's ends .... equal political lib-
erty is [therefore] not solely a means. . . . [It]
strengthen[s] men's sense of their own worth, enlarge[s]
their intellectual and moral sensibilities, and lay[s] the
basis for a sense of duty and obligation upon which the
stability of just institutions depends.
5 73
CONCLUSION
Amendment Two, if enacted, would have violated the first principle
of justice by giving to one class of persons a greater liberty than it gave
to another.574 The Supreme Court correctly recognized, therefore, in
Romer v. Evans, that this law offended the Constitution. In striking down
Amendment Two, the Court applied a rational basis test with bite in the
tradition of Metropolitan Life, Logan, Cleburne, and Moreno.575 And the
Court's decision undoubtedly fits very comfortably within this line of
cases. In addition, the Court's invalidation of Amendment Two in the
context of a test that almost inevitably results in the opposite outcome
represents a strong statement regarding constitutional constraints on ma-
jority rule with respect to the gay, lesbian and bisexual citizens of this
country.
But the Romer decision would have fit equally comfortably within
the Hunter, Washington and Davis line of cases. 576 Perhaps the Court
situated its decision in the Moreno line-and refused to embrace the fun-
damental rights analysis offered by the Colorado Supreme Court-be-
cause it wanted to avoid entering the substantive due process quagmire.
Perhaps it wanted to avoid such a holding in the context of a gay rights
case, either out of animosity towards queers or out of a prudent desire to
avoid fueling the flames of the no-special-rights-for-gays argument. Or
perhaps the members of the Court just believe that substantive due pro-
cess has gotten out of hand. Whatever their individual or collective rea-
sons, and despite their rejection of the rationale below, a close reading of
the Romer decision reveals that the majority demonstrated an apprecia-
573 Id.
574 Id. at 203.
575 See supra § I(B) (2).
576 See supra § I(C).
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don for the very same principles that underlie the Colorado court's
analysis.
And well it should have. As this Note has demonstrated, equal par-
ticipation in the political process represents an interest fundamental to
our system of government.577 The principles of justice advanced by such
an interest are, from a jurisprudential standpoint, "[c]entral . . . to
the ... rule of law and to our own Constitution's guarantee of equal
protection .... ,"578 As Justice Kennedy wrote, laws that prevent govern-
ment from remaining open to all who seek its assistance are "not within
our constitutional tradition. '57
9
The lesbian, gay and bisexual community has suffered discrimina-
tion throughout its history in this country, beginning in the days of the
Mattachine Society and the Daughters of Bilitis, continuing through a
period of growing public presence after the Stonewall Rebellion, and
concluding, for the time being, with the viciously anti-gay opinion in
Bowers v. Hardwick.5 80 If the citizens of the United States truly want a
just society, and if the Constitution of the United States provides the
machinery for creating that just society, then the Supreme Court cor-
rectly seized the opportunity, in its decision in Romer v. Evans, to take
stock of this history and of its own case law and to strike down Amend-
ment Two.
Teresa M. Bruce
577 "It may be ... that in a well-ordered society the two principles of justice are used by
courts to interpret those parts of the constitution regulating freedom of thought and conscience,
and guaranteeing equal protection of the laws." Id. at 349 (citing Ronald Dworkin, The Model
of Rules, 35 U. Cn. L. REv. 14, 21-29 (1967)).
578 Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1628 (1996).
579 Id.
580 See supra § I(A).
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